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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the Anglo-American reception, from the 1930s to the early 
2000s, of the ideas of the German political theorist Carl Schmitt. The introduction 
provides an overview the key concepts in Schmitt’s writings in the 1920s. Chapter one 
examines Schmitt’s influence on the German-Jewish émigré political theorists Leo 
Strauss and Hans Morgenthau, in an attempt to explain how Schmitt’s ideas were initially 
transported from Germany to the U.S.  The second chapter is a more detailed case study 
of the American leftist journal, Telos, which played a key role in introducing Schmitt’s 
writings to a broader, English language audience in the late 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter 
three examines the reception of Schmitt among left and left-liberal Anglo-American 
political theorists more generally. Both chapter two and three address the larger question 
of which elements of the Anglo-American left were drawn to Schmitt and why the ideas 
of this conservative German thinker – and former Nazi – still seemed relevant to them.   
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Introduction 
Why has the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt become so popular 
in recent American political theory? From the early-1920s to the mid-1930s Schmitt was 
one of the best-known legal and political scholars in Germany. From his work on 
constitutional theory in the early 1920s to his critique of parliamentarism in the early 
1930s, Schmitt was recognized in Germany mostly as a critic of liberalism and 
parliamentary democracy. He was also critical of the Weimar Republic in favor of a 
sovereign ruler. Schmitt’s work on political theory led him to join the National Socialist 
Party, which eventually resulted in him becoming one of their principal legal and political 
thinkers. Due to his membership in the National Socialist Party, he was barred from 
teaching at German universities after the war. But he continued to study and write about 
international law until his death in 1985. Since his death, Schmitt’s reception and 
reputation have grown internationally. His thought has gained widespread attention 
among conservatives, mainly because of his criticism of liberalism and parliamentarism. 
Surprisingly, Schmitt has also influenced the political Left. As a longtime enemy of the 
political Left, it would seem unlikely to find Schmitt appearing in the leftist journal, 
Telos, as well as in a number of books written by those on the Left during the 1990s. Not 
all scholars found Schmitt’s political work relevant; there were many on the Left who 
believed Schmitt was dangerous. This study is concerned with why there was a political 
divide in the reception of Schmitt and why it matters. It is important to understand how 
Schmitt’s American reception initially developed, and why it continued during the 1990s. 
We will see that Schmitt’s reception was not arbitrary, but rather indicative of how 
weakened the political Left was in their desperate attempt to find answers.      
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Given how widespread Schmitt’s American reception has become during the 
latter part of the twentieth century, his reception is in need of an explanation. This study 
is partly concerned with Schmitt’s impact on conservative intellectuals in the mid-
twentieth century. His posthumous reception in the Leftist journal, Telos, was Schmitt’s 
first sustained appearance among the political Left, which would have a lasting effect in 
regards to how some on the political Left would broaden their perspective on Schmitt 
during the 1990s through the 2000s.  
This study will approach Schmitt’s American reception in three chapters. The first 
chapter addresses Schmitt’s relationship to Hans Morgenthau and Leo Strauss during the 
1920s and 1930s. It will explain how Schmitt’s relationship to them had an effect on their 
political work as well as Schmitt’s work. The conservative-realist, Hans Morgenthau, 
admired Schmitt’s concept of the political, which eventually influenced how Morgenthau 
thought of power politics. Considered one of the founders of neo-conservatism, Leo 
Strauss is another political theorist who had a relationship with Schmitt, which affected 
how Strauss and Schmitt thought of Thomas Hobbes and political liberalism.  
The final two chapters of this study are concerned with why the political Left 
became interested in Schmitt’s political theory. Although many on the political Left 
considered Schmitt a counter-revolutionary and a dangerous mind, some of them during 
the mid-1980s changed their view of Schmitt. This reassessment of Schmitt led to 
discussions of how his concept of friend and enemy, and his critique of political 
liberalism and globalization were relevant to Leftist problems. We will examine what 
some Leftist scholars thought of Schmitt from the early 1980s to the early and mid-
2000s. Ultimately, this study will shed light on why Schmitt has been widely discussed 
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since the late 1980s and why he is important in contemporary political theory. Although 
this study is not intended to be an exhaustive study of Carl Schmitt, it is intended to show 
why some prominent leftist thinkers involved with Telos, as well as leftist scholars and 
intellectuals outside this journal, wrote about Schmitt. It will provide an historical 
overview of some enigmatic changes in American political theory at a time when 
Schmitt’s ideas were being discussed among the political Left. It will introduce the ideas 
of Schmitt and analyze why he has become a prominent political theorist in the U.S 
among the political Left. But before examining the introduction and ongoing reception of 
Schmitt’s ideas in Anglo-American scholarly and political debates, it is important to 
understand some of Schmitt’s key ideas as they emerged in the historical context of 
Weimar Germany.  
 
Carl Schmitt’s Political Thought in the 1920s. 
 A brief introduction to some of Schmitt’s main writings and key concepts from 
the 1920s will be useful in setting the stage for our examination of his later reception in 
the U.S. The thinkers we are concerned with here would incorporate these concepts into 
their own political writings and utilize them in different ways in theoretical debates in the 
U.S.  
Schmitt’s first political work in 1922, Political Theology, introduces his concept 
of sovereignty. Written in the early years of the Weimar Republic, Political Theology is 
both a critique of liberalism and a defense of a sovereign ruler defined by his power to act 
during exceptional situations. Divided into four chapters, Political Theology mostly 
consists of Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty and, in particular, how a sovereign ruler 
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acts during an exceptional situation and why the sovereignty of the state is based on 
theological concepts.  
 Schmitt defines sovereignty as the power to decide on the exception.1 He makes it 
clear that only the sovereign can act during an exceptional situation and make a decision 
for the general public. Part of his justification of a sovereign ruler, is that he believes that 
there must be unlimited jurisdictional competence. The sovereign ruler would be able to 
act freely in an emergency situation. This belief is contrary to the liberal constitutional 
point of view. Schmitt explains that the liberal constitutional point of view limits any idea 
of sovereignty with checks and balances. There is no clear sovereignty. Schmitt argues 
this in chapter one of Political Theology, addressing how the sovereignty of the state 
eliminates any extreme emergency situation by deciding how to act upon it. He refers to 
Jean Bodin, a French political theorist, as one of the first theorists to write about how the 
sovereignty of the state is not bound by laws. Following Bodin’s theory, Schmitt argues 
that the legal order rests on a sovereign decision and not the norm.2  
 We can put Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, as the one who decides in an 
emergency situation, into its historical context by looking briefly at his analysis of Article 
48 of the German constitution of 1919.3 Schmitt believes that the exception is declared by 
the president of the Reich, but is limited by parliament.4 It is obvious that Schmitt’s 
support for sovereignty is tied to his critique of liberal constitutionalism, which 
underlined the newly formed Weimar Republic. Schmitt points out, however, that it was 
liberal constitutionalism, not article 48, which limited exceptional powers. This is clear 
                                                        
1 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Trans. George Schwab (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 5.  
2 Ibid., 10.  
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Ibid.  
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when he states, “But only the arrangement of the precondition that governs the invocation 
of exceptional powers corresponds to the liberal constitutional tendency, not the content 
of Article 48. Article 48 grants unlimited power.”5 Schmitt’s critique of liberal 
constitutionalism in Political Theology is based on how liberal constitutionalism limits 
sovereign power. Sovereign power should have the ability to eliminate the norm in the 
state of exception and to decide the exception beyond the liberal constitution. According 
to Schmitt, it is the sovereign’s power to decide and he need not defer to the procedural 
norms of parliamentary government.  
 Political Theology defines the role of sovereignty in contrast to liberal 
constitutionalism. Schmitt further defines sovereignty as a secularized theological 
concept.6 He argues that the concept of sovereignty was transferred from theology to the 
theory of the state.7 Sovereignty is represented as God. Schmitt also explains that the 
exception in jurisprudence is similar to the miracle in theology. Political Theology offers 
some of Schmitt’s major concepts in his theory of the sovereignty of the state. 
 In 1923, Schmitt further elaborated on his critique of liberal constitutionalism in 
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. He explains how the scientific study of 
democracy must begin with political theology.8 Beginning in the nineteenth century, 
parliamentarism and democracy were interwoven. Schmitt argues that democracy has 
since then been separated from parliamentarism. In particular, he argues that 
parliamentarism has changed since the nineteenth century, such that its original purpose 
and political justification have been undermined. Parliamentary government was intended 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 36. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1988), 32. 
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for openness and discussion among representatives of all significant social groups. 
According to Schmitt, however, this system of balanced rational debate no longer exists. 
It has become a façade, which no longer represents genuine public discourse. In turn, 
parliamentarism has become committees of parties or party coalitions that decide behind 
closed doors.9  
 In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt further developed his critique 
of parliamentarism, by defending certain concepts of popular sovereignty and democracy. 
In the first chapter of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, he argues that popular 
sovereignty represented a true democracy. Here, Schmitt discusses the history of 
democracy and parliamentarism. One of the characteristics of a democracy, according to 
Schmitt, is that it is sociologically and psychologically heterogeneous. It is separate from 
the economic sphere because it has a string of identities.10 Schmitt believed that these 
identities are what defined a democracy. These identities, however, can never form an 
absolute identity. Schmitt explains that, although these identities represented a 
democracy, which formed the will of the people, individuals were selected in the 
nineteenth century to represent the people and to give them an absolute identity. But 
when this happened, according to Schmitt, democracy was forfeited. Similarly, a 
constitution cannot contradict the will of the people. According to Schmitt, liberalism 
viewed democracy as abstract, placing it in the economic sphere. Being in this sphere was 
the reason that Schmitt wanted to separate democracy from economics. It was abstract, 
not concrete. Schmitt argues that the will of the minority and majority of the people can 
                                                        
9 Ibid., 50. 
10 Ibid.,25. 
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never be the unanimous will of the people.11 Regardless, the minority and the majority 
represent a certain identity of the state. The identity of the people is represented by a 
sovereignty of the state. This sovereignty represents the concept of legitimacy, the power 
to act for the people against the enemy; to be the will of the people.    
 Schmitt also discusses the problem of parliamentarism in chapter two of The 
Crisis of Parliamentarism. He explains how parliamentarism originated as a means to be 
expedient, because all the people could not gather together at the same time and everyone 
cannot know every detail of policy debates. Therefore, parliamentarism was a forum for 
the people. Schmitt believes that a single trusted representative could also decide for the 
people.12 Popular sovereignty was a way for the people to elect a dictator, or a sovereign 
ruler to decide for the people. The openness, the balance of power, and limitations of 
legislation, and parliamentary discussion are what limit parliamentarism. Schmitt 
believed it was essential for the sovereign to be able to decide for the people without 
limitations. A sovereign ruler could decide in an emergency situation, without the 
corruption, the indecisiveness, and the limitations of legislation, which Schmitt believed 
existed in parliamentarism. 
 Following his critique of parliamentarism, Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political 
further addressed his distaste for liberal constitutionalism. Published in 1927, The 
Concept of the Political introduces Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy. He believed 
that political actions and motives could be reduced to the distinction between friend and 
enemy. He argued that knowing your friends and enemies defined politics. His distinction 
was a way to separate political entities beyond aesthetic, economic, or moral distinctions. 
                                                        
11 Ibid., 26. 
12 Ibid., 34. 
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Furthermore, Schmitt argued that the enemy is not necessary evil, but an indication of a 
stranger, suggesting that conflicts are possible.13 The friend and enemy also defined the 
political as a concrete situation, different from economic and moral conceptions, which 
Schmitt believed weakened the political. Economics and moral conceptions were more 
akin to liberalism, because they lacked a clearly defined adversary. 
 Schmitt defended the concept of friend and enemy because it provided a concrete 
justification for a sovereign ruler who could act for the people against the enemy. He also 
notes that the friend and enemy distinction avoided pacifism. The friend and enemy 
distinction provided the real possibility of physical killing.14 It provides the possibility of 
war. Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy appeared as an alternative to liberalism. He 
believed that liberals are pacifist; they avoid any possibility of war. For politics to be 
recognized, there must be that possibility of war. Schmitt argued that the political is 
destroyed if one refuses to distinguish clearly between friend and enemy.  
 Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy was based on a critique of liberal notions 
of global order. He argued that the political world is not universalistic, because then there 
would be cease to be a political grouping of friend and enemy. The concept of humanity 
that exists is in a liberal global order is used as an instrument for imperialistic 
expansion.15 Schmitt argued that this idealism denies the enemy. According to Schmitt, 
humanitarianism is not a political concept. Schmitt states, “Humanity as such cannot 
wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet.”16 In his critique of ethical-
humanitarian movements, Schmitt is critical of liberalism. This criticism is seen when 
                                                        
13 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Trans. George Scwab (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 22.  
14 Ibid., 33. 
15 Ibid., 54. 
16 Ibid., 54.  
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Schmitt explains how liberalism turns politics into private law and private enterprise. By 
focusing on these concepts, liberalism deprives politics of significant meaning – the 
friend and enemy distinction. Schmitt believes that economics and morality assume a 
concrete political meaning, but do not contain political conflict.  
 In 1928, Schmitt wrote Constitutional Theory, in which he discussed the origin 
and purpose of a constitution. Schmitt discusses the norms of a constitution and what 
makes it valid. For a constitution to be valid, Schmitt argues that it needs a political 
decision by an authority. This decision preexists the constitution. It is important to note 
that Schmitt was writing at a time when the Weimar Republic was in debt to other 
countries following the Versailles Treaty. With an unstable Weimar Republic as well as 
the League of Nations being formed in 1919 as a way to maintain global peace, Schmitt 
wrote about constitutional law as well as a sovereign leader to decide for the people. He 
did so in order to develop a critique of the new liberal-Wilsonian global order and of the 
victorious Allies’ efforts during this time to reestablish what he viewed as anachronistic 
traditions of nineteenth-century parliamentarism. Schmitt makes clear that a constitution 
is not based on a norm. It is based on a political decision that determines the validity of 
the constitution. A decision maker, or sovereign, acts through the will of the constitution, 
according to Schmitt.  
 In chapter nine of Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory, he examines the legitimacy of 
a constitution. He believes that an authority determines the legitimacy of a constitution. It 
determines the will of the people. When Schmitt explains this legitimacy, he discusses 
how the people’s constitution-making will is expressed clearly through popular vote, to 
elect a decision-maker. As in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the authority of the political ruler 
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emanates from popular consent, not divine rights, or other forms of traditional, top-down 
legitimacy. We also see how Schmitt explains a dictatorship in relation to Article 48. 
Article 48 states that the dictatorship has the authority to compel the federal states 
execution of Reich laws.17 Schmitt believes this article supported a sovereign ruler to be 
the constitution-making will. His critique of parliamentarism is also present in 
Constitutional Theory. His critique of a parliamentary system led Schmitt to believe that 
only a sovereign ruler representing a homogenous body of people could give legitimacy 
to the constitution. 
 Taken together, these key concepts from Schmitt’s writings from the 1920s 
represented a fundamental critique of liberalism, which articulated clearly and powerfully 
many of the discontents that existed among conservative elites in the Weimar Republic. 
At the same time, Schmitt’s defense of an homogenous and authoritarian concept of 
democracy, which did not see any contradiction between popular sovereignty and 
dictatorship, anticipated the destruction of the Weimar Republic that would be carried by 
some of these conservatives elites with the help of the radical, right-wing populist 
movement that gathered under the banner of National Socialism in the early-1930s. But, 
as we shall see, Schmitt’s own support of National Socialism thoroughly discredited his 
thought only in the eyes of some of his later critics. For many others, on both the right 
and left, his thought remained an important source of insight into the pitfalls and abuses 
of liberal political theory. In what follows, we shall examine some of the most important 
figures involved in the introduction and ongoing reception of Schmitt’s ideas in Anglo-
American scholarly and political debates from World War II to the present.   
                                                        
17 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory: Trans and Edit. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), 315.   
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Chapter I 
 Carl Schmitt’s Relationship to Hans Morgenthau and Leo Strauss   
Carl Schmitt’s influence on political theorists in the U.S has had a significant 
impact on American political theory. This chapter is concerned with his influence on the 
German-American political scientist and Jewish émigré, Hans Morgenthau, and the 
German-American political philosopher as well as Jewish émigré, Leo Strauss. Both were 
strongly influenced by Schmitt’s concept of politics during the late 1920s and early 
1930s. The connection between these political theorists and Schmitt indicates how 
Schmitt’s political thought initially developed in the U.S. It ultimately explains why 
Morgenthau and Strauss had a relationship to Schmitt, and why his concept of politics 
influenced Morgenthau’s thought on international relations as well as Strauss’s 
understanding of political liberalism. 
This chapter explains how Schmitt’s ideas influenced Morgenthau and Strauss. It 
will examine why Schmitt had a significant influence on Morgenthau that affected his 
perception of political value, and how Strauss’s critique of Schmitt’s concept of 
liberalism affected how Strauss interpreted liberalism beyond Schmitt. Morgenthau and 
Strauss were influential in the rise of political realism in international politics and neo-
conservatism in the 1960s. This chapter will also demonstrate how Morgenthau and 
Strauss had an effect on Schmitt that led him to change part of what he wrote in The 
Concept of the Political. Examining Morgenthau and Strauss’s relationship to Schmitt 
will also help us to understand when and why Schmitt’s theoretical ideas first appeared in 
the U.S. In short, the overall purpose of this chapter is to explain what sort of connection 
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existed between Schmitt and Morgenthau and Strauss. It also seeks to determine which 
parts of Schmitt’s thought Morgenthau and Strauss found beneficial in their study of 
political theory and which have influenced American political theory more generally.  
 
Introduction to Hans Morgenthau’s Life and Work 
Schmitt influenced Morgenthau’s interpretation of international politics in the 
U.S. After Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political was published in 1921, it would 
influence a young German by the name of Hans Morgenthau. Born in Coburg, Germany 
in 1904, Morgenthau was educated at the Universities of Berlin, Frankfurt, and Munich. 
After he graduated, he taught and practiced law in Frankfurt from 1923 until 1932, when 
he was offered a teaching position at the University of Geneva.18 Following teaching and 
earning his Habilitation academic credential at the University of Geneva, he accepted 
another teaching position in Madrid in 1935.19 From 1936 to 1937, Morgenthau and his 
wife traveled to Italy and other parts of Europe, in part because there was a military 
uprising in Madrid and the Spanish Civil War had begun. Eventually, he emigrated to the 
U.S in 1937 where he would become a powerful influence in American politics as a 
teacher, writer, and lawyer.20  
Before addressing Morgenthau’s relationship to Schmitt, it is important to 
understand some of Morgenthau’s work and its impact in the U.S. It is important to know 
that Morgenthau was part of the intellectual migration of the 1930s that also included 
theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and others. In 1929 he published his first 
                                                        
18 Christoph Frei, Hans Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2001), 43. 
19 Ibid., 53. 
20 Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Tragedy, eds. Kenneth Thompson and Robert Myers (New 
Brunswick: U.S.A: Transaction Books, 1984), 384.  
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book: The International Administration of Justice, Its Essence and Its Limits. In later 
years Morgenthau would be an active participant in those who were critical of political 
liberalism. He would be part of a different school of political theory. John Gunnell 
discusses this political theory in The Descent of Political Theory21, in which he argues 
that Morgenthau’s 1946 work, Scientific Man and Power Politics, contributed to a more 
general turn away from liberalism. According to Gunnell, Morgenthau was part of the 
Chicago School that included Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell.22    
 When Morgenthau arrived in the U.S in 1937, he emphasized the importance of 
political power, believing that it played a crucial role in defining politics. His work on 
political power is especially evident in Scientific Man versus Power Politics, which was 
his first book in English in 1946.23 After this publication, his Politics Among Nations24 
appeared in 1948. One particular work on Morgenthau that was published in 1977, Truth 
and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau25, contained essays about his personal life 
and political work. One of the essays: “The Mission of Morgenthau,”26 written by Robert 
Osgood, an expert on foreign policy, discusses Morgenthau’s work on political power in 
international relations. Osgood explains that Morgenthau disagreed with the notion that 
the economy could provide political stability. Morgenthau disagreed that the U.S. could 
establish political stability with other nations. He believed, instead, that political conflict 
was inevitable. For example, Morgenthau believed that the Vietnam War would never 
benefit the U.S economically, but rather that it was an expression of U.S military 
                                                        
21 John Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 330.  
22 Ibid., 195.  
23 Hans Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography 73. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Tragedy. 
26 Ibid., 32. 
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power.27 He advocated for a global balance of power. The Vietnam War, according to 
Morgenthau, was a way for the U.S. to define its national interests in terms of power.     
The political scientist, Tang Tsou in his essay, “‘Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics’ Revisited,”28 explains how Morgenthau’s Scientific Man vs. Power Politics is a 
critique of the dominant rationalist social, political, and moral philosophy of the modern 
West.29 Similar to Osgood, Tsou argues that Morgenthau believed that rationality would 
always be overcome by superior power. Furthermore, Morgenthau also believed that 
politics was an art and not a science that could be rationalized.30 Tsou argues that 
Morgenthau thought that power politics served a moral value, and had a political purpose. 
Although Morgenthau considered political action as “inevitably evil,” he believed that to 
act nonetheless required moral courage.31  
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International 
Relations32 is another anthology on Hans Morgenthau, which contains essays by different 
authors on his political work. One essay, specifically, “The Balance of Power in Politics 
Among Nations,” provides some insight into Morgenthau’s thought. The author, Richard 
Little discusses Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations in order to explain Morgenthau’s 
belief in the balance of political power. Little explains how Morgenthau’s belief in 
political power was defined by the transformation of the international system from 1919 
to 1973.33 Morgenthau believed that the First World War transformed political power 
because of the development of nationalism. Germany, the U.S., and the Soviet Union 
                                                        
27 Ibid., 33.  
28 Ibid., 41.  
29Ibid., 50.  
30 Ibid., 47.  
31 Ibid., 51.  
32 Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. Ed. Michael C. 
Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 278.  
33 Ibid., 155.  
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adhered to a form of “nationalistic universalism” that, according to Morgenthau, was 
used by different ideologies to contest for power. He argues that the power of nation-
states was diminishing in the face of these rising great powers. According to Little, 
Morgenthau favored a world in which social justice and national self-determination were 
promoted.34 He believed that man could remedy his own misery. Little concludes his 
analysis of Politics Among Nations by arguing that Morgenthau ultimately recognized 
how politics is constrained by brutal forces.  
Overall, these essays on Morgenthau highlight some of the particular reasons why 
he was an advocate of political realism. These essays also illuminate Morgenthau’s 
interpretation of politics, which is important in understanding the difference between 
Morgenthau and Schmitt. Morgenthau’s The Concept of the Political demonstrates 
Schmitt’s influence on him. It also makes clear that Morgenthau acknowledged the 
concept of power politics. In the introduction to the 2012 English translation of 
Morgenthau’s The Concept of the Political, Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch argue that 
despite Morgenthau’s criticisms of Schmitt, he agreed with Schmitt regarding the ways in 
which human interests collide and how dominant social and political institutions 
emerge.35 Understanding some of Morgenthau’s significant work as well as what some 
authors say about him provides an understanding of how Morgenthau and Schmitt were 
alike in their political thought.  
Schmitt’s Influence on Morgenthau 
When Morgenthau wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1929, in part as a response to 
Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, it would attract the renowned political theorist Carl 
                                                        
34 Ibid.,157. 
35 Hans Morgenthau, The Concept of the Political. Ed. Hartmut Behr, Felix Rösch (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 176. 
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Schmitt’s attention. After Schmitt’s review of Morgenthau’s dissertation, The 
International Administration of Justice, Its Essence and Its Limits, Schmitt would meet 
Morgenthau that year to discuss it with him. The meeting, however, went very badly 
according to Morgenthau,36 who described Schmitt as one of the “evilest” men he had 
ever met. Regardless of his dislike for Schmitt, Morgenthau stated in his autobiography 
that: “It was inevitable that I would be influenced – however temporarily and negatively 
– by Carl Schmitt.”37 Because of Morgenthau’s Jewish heritage, his admiration for 
Schmitt further faded when Schmitt joined the National Socialist Party. Nonetheless, 
Schmitt would influence Morgenthau. Part of Schmitt’s influence on Morgenthau is seen 
in Morgenthau’s work The Concept of the Political, which was first published in French 
in 1933. 
In Morgenthau’s The Concept of the Political, he attempts to distance himself 
from Schmitt’s definition of politics in terms of friend and enemy. He argues that 
Schmitt’s friend and enemy concept did not encompass morality, economy, or politics.38 
According to Morgenthau: “…could we assert in the same way that the enemy represents 
what is politically without value, while the friend represents what is politically of value?  
The answer is obviously no.”39 This interpretation addresses Morgenthau’s disagreement 
with Schmitt, especially how he considered Schmitt’s reduction of politics to friend and 
enemy as tautological. Nevertheless, Morgenthau did accept some aspects of Schmitt’s 
distinction between friend and enemy: “it was on the basis that the one who distinguishes 
between friend and foe while pursuing political, moral, aesthetic or economic goals also 
                                                        
36 Ibid.,17. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 112.  
39 Ibid.  
  18 
establishes a distinction between what tends to promote the realization of his or her goal 
and what tends to hinder it.”40  Behr and Rösch argue that Morgenthau believed the 
political was defined by the humanization of politics. It contained characteristics that held 
political value. From this perspective, Morgenthau went beyond Schmitt’s concept of 
friend and enemy because he considered it tautological. 
After Morgenthau’s The Concept of the Political was published in 1933, he 
continued to express political ideas similar to Schmitt. In 1998, Hans Karl Pichler, 
addresses this similarity in his article: “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl 
Schmitt in Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics.”41 Pichler’s explains how 
Morgenthau’s theory of power politics is connected to Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. 
Pichler formulates his argument based on Morgenthau’s “Six Principles of Political 
Realism,” taken from chapter six of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, which was 
originally published in 1948. Pichler’s overall purpose is to locate Morgenthau’s ideas in 
the German intellectual tradition, thereby denaturalizing him as an American thinker.42 In 
so doing, Pichler believes that Schmitt was a significant influence on Morgenthau. This 
influence is evident in their similar interpretation of “the political,” as well as their 
personal relationship. Pichler presents their similarity in their critique of liberalism and 
their belief in power politics. Morgenthau believed that the search for power is always 
directed toward another individual, similar to what Schmitt also argued in his concept of 
friend and enemy.  
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Pichler also argues that Morgenthau and Schmitt agreed on the idea that enmity 
defined international politics. Schmitt’s interpretation of power politics would have an 
impact on Morgenthau’s belief that universalism was achieved through political power. 
Pichler argues that Morgenthau attempted to overcome the value of the social sciences in 
order to analyze international politics “objectively,” as the ultimate pursuit and 
preservation of national interest.43 At the conclusion of his essay, Pichler argues that 
Morgenthau’s work is falsely perceived as being in the “American positivist tradition,” 
and that it was instead an attempt to transfer European philosophical problems into the 
American political system.44 Pichler examines how these ideas are transformed in 
Morgenthau’s relocation from Europe to America. His overall analysis of Morgenthau 
offers an explanation of how Schmitt’s ideas were transferred from Europe to America 
through Morgenthau’s political thought.  
In Carl Schmitt: The End of Law,45 William Scheuerman includes a chapter on 
Morgenthau’s relationship to Schmitt. Scheuerman explains that, despite Morgenthau’s 
personal abhorrence of Schmitt, especially after he joined the National Socialists, 
Schmitt’s political thought could still be seen in Morgenthau. When addressing their 
relationship, Scheuerman refers to the German philosopher, Heinrich Meier’s argument, 
about how theology was influential in Schmitt’s political theory. Scheuerman disagrees 
with Meir and argues instead that Morgenthau distanced himself from Schmitt. For 
example, in 1933 Morgenthau criticized Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, yet 
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Schmitt did not reply to Morgenthau’s remarks.46 Morgenthau’s critique was an attempt 
to distance himself from Schmitt, believing him to be misguided, which became more 
evident after Schmitt joined the Nazis. Moreover, Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau 
and Schmitt diverged in how they perceived the value of a political state. For 
Morgenthau, the value of a certain political entity was based on morality, aesthetics, and 
economics. For Schmitt, however, these values were not relevant to politics, which he 
viewed as an autonomous sphere, whose values are defined by the distinction between 
friend and foe, not by morality, aesthetics, or economics. Scheuerman makes the 
distinction between Morgenthau and Schmitt clearer when he states: “For Morgenthau, 
the reduction of politics to the criterion of friend and foe is conceptually arbitrary. The 
criterion of friend versus foe fails to capture the distinct characteristics of political 
life…”47 Morgenthau believes Schmitt’s concept of friend and foe did not define the 
value of the political as a concrete substance. It did not recognize the value in morality, 
aesthetics, or economics. Ultimately, Morgenthau believes that Schmitt’s concept of 
friend and foe does not capture the core of political existence. Regardless of their 
differences, Scheuerman also notes Morgenthau’s unusual reference to Schmitt in 1979 
as brilliant and original for his contribution to international law. In his attempt to explain 
Morgenthau’s admiration for Schmitt, Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau agreed with 
Schmitt’s critique of American liberalism and part of his definition of political entities.  
At the end of Scheuerman’s study, he argues that Morgenthau was not indebted to 
Schmitt, but rather respected Schmitt’s critique of international law. Morgenthau and 
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Schmitt shared a tradition of realist thought in international politics.48 Scheuerman tries 
to show how Morgenthau and Schmitt differed in regards to realist thought. Morgenthau 
argues that politics was conducted in terms of a  “Realism of Peace,” similar to Thomas 
Hobbes. They held the belief that, regardless of all the danger in human nature, it was 
possible to promote peace. Scheuerman argues, however, that Morgenthau still believed 
in the tragedy of war because of the inevitable evil in man. Yet, for Morgenthau, this evil 
could be minimized. Carl Schmitt, in contrast, supported the “Realism of War,” which 
Scheuerman believes was based on his interest in “…exposing the inconsistencies and 
contradictions of contemporary international law.”49 Revealing that he is not sympathetic 
to Schmitt, Scheuerman believes Schmitt’s involvement with National Socialism was 
based on his belief in imperial power, and was an attempt to overcome liberal 
international relations.    
Scheuerman also wrote an article in 2007 titled, “Was Morgenthau a Realist? 
Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics.”50 Scheuerman addresses Morgenthau’s 
similarity to Schmitt when he states: “Not surprisingly, key components of Scientific Man 
can be read as a critical dialogue with Schmitt.”51 With the comparison of Morgenthau’s 
Scientific Man to Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, it was evident, according to 
Scheuerman, that both of these scholars were critical of the development of technology 
and science. For many liberals and leftist, Western modernity was a way beyond political 
conflict. Morgenthau and Schmitt, however, believed in the inevitable conflict of war that 
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would occur in politics, and that Western modernity could not prevent the unavoidable 
outbreak of war.  
Furthermore, Scientific Man formulated a critique of modern liberal international 
law,52 presenting Morgenthau as a realist, indicating a close affinity to Schmitt’s political 
thought. For Morgenthau to separate himself from Schmitt, he argues that moralism was 
part of political nature, which Schmitt rejected. Schmitt believes that the idea of friend 
and foe held no moral value. Scheuerman concludes his comparison of Morgenthau and 
Schmitt by suggesting that Morgenthau’s ethics ultimately separated him from Schmitt, 
defining politics through moralism, whereas Schmitt joined Nazism, in which there was 
not any sense of moralism in political nature.      
Throughout Morgenthau’s international career he subscribed to political realism, 
the belief that politics is defined by power. From this notion of politics, scholars 
recognize the close similarity between Morgenthau’s advocacy of power politics and 
Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy, suggesting that Schmitt’s political thought was 
transferred to the U.S through Morgenthau. A closer examination of the relationship 
between Morgenthau and Schmitt reveals how much Schmitt influenced Morgenthau, and 
how Schmitt’s political thought reached the U.S before his posthumous reception.  
In Realism Reconsidered,53 which includes a number of essays written on 
Morgenthau’s impact on international relations, there is further indication of Schmitt’s 
influence on Morgenthau. In his essay, Chris Brown compares and contrasts Morgenthau 
and Schmitt’s positions on modern international relations. Schmitt argues that the new 
concept of war in the twentieth century was disastrous because it would eliminate the 
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bracketing of war that defined friend and foe, leading to total war against the enemy. 
Schmitt disagreed with universalism. Morgenthau, however, argues in his essay, “The 
Twilight of International Morality,”54 that the new conception of war, which was based 
on universal boundaries, represented “genuine moral progress,” but is still dangerous 
because states and the people who adhere to this non-political conception of war have to 
deal with people who exercise force and accept no limits, beyond political actions.55 
Brown also addresses the issue of universalism between Morgenthau and Schmitt. For 
Schmitt, the old European spatial order has been destroyed and no new nomos had taken 
its place. Morgenthau also believed that the old European international society was gone. 
He believed it was the failure to agree on a new basis of civilization that brings about the 
twilight of international morality.56 
William Scheuerman also wrote an essay in Realism Reconsidered, explaining the 
“hidden dialogue” between Morgenthau and Schmitt. This “hidden dialogue,” according 
to Scheuerman, provides a clearer understanding of Morgenthau’s idiosyncratic realism. 
With both scholars explaining twentieth-century global politics primarily in terms of the 
increased power of the U.S, Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau and Schmitt believed 
that the U.S was undermining a European dominated system with American liberalism, 
toward universalism.57 They believed there was no escaping war; therefore, it must be 
bracketed among nation-states. They felt that the U.S was controlling universalism as a 
form of American imperialism, spreading American liberalism as a humanitarian cause.  
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Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau’s criticism of U.S foreign policy was one of 
the ways in which Schmitt influenced Morgenthau.58 Both of these German scholars 
believed that American interventionism was a form of imperial power. It proved to 
Morgenthau and Schmitt that politics was defined by power, not legal peace treaties, 
something Schmitt had seen fail in the Versailles Treaty. Schmitt was also critical of the 
Monroe Doctrine because it allowed the U.S to intervene in Latin America, providing the 
U.S with an imperial power to enforce its liberal democracy. Scheuerman argues that 
Schmitt’s cynical view of the Monroe Doctrine eventually led to his justification of Nazi 
imperialism.59 Although Morgenthau was critical of Schmitt’s interpretation of the 
Monroe Doctrine, because it led to his justification of Nazism, Morgenthau’s 
Westphalian system showed that he was critical of universal law and instead favored the 
sovereignty of the state. Morgenthau’s perspective, according to Scheuerman, reflects a 
similar position to Schmitt’s, which was that the Monroe Doctrine and non-intervention 
treaties were a form of U.S universal domination. One difference, however, between 
Morgenthau and Schmitt on the Monroe Doctrine was that Schmitt believed that this 
doctrine could be revitalized by “establishing new modes of regionally based 
imperialism.” While Morgenthau argues that the Monroe Doctrine would keep the U.S 
involved in trying to balance power in Europe, it would also threaten U.S hegemony in 
the Americas.60  
In another section of Scheuerman’s essay, he explains how Morgenthau’s post-
World War II writings argued for a world state because of the increasing possibility that 
the sovereign state held the power of mass destruction through nuclear weapons. Towards 
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the end of his essay, Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau is held back by Schmitt’s 
influence on him. Scheuerman states: “Morgenthau was never able to think creatively 
enough about the possibility of a novel global order because he carried too much 
Schmittian intellectual baggage.”61 Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau was not able to 
break free of Schmitt’s criticism of universalism, preventing Morgenthau from ever 
considering possible alternatives to a centralized world state.62 At the conclusion of 
Scheuerman’s essay, he argues that a “hidden dialogue” existed between Morgenthau and 
Schmitt, which indicates how Schmitt influenced Morgenthau. According to Scheuerman, 
it played a “crucial role” in Morgenthau’s unsuccessful attempt to synthesize realism and 
international relations.  
It is important for one to understand what kind of influence Morgenthau had on 
neo-conservatives, but also how he stood apart from them. Michael William states,  
…Morgenthau’s writings are replete with concerns that resonate with contemporary neo-
conservatism, from the dangers of decadent liberalism, to the crisis of a technocratic or narrowly 
pluralistic liberal-democracy, to the challenges face by liberal-democracies in foreign affairs – 
especially in conditions of emergency.63 
 
Williams demonstrates that Morgenthau’s influence resonated with neo-conservatism. He 
helped to reinvigorate hawkish Republican values. Yet, as Williams also explains, 
Morgenthau believes that national greatness could easily become a crusading foreign 
policy.64 Williams also believes that Morgenthau was critical of the issues that neo-
conservatives presented, because they were often a radical response to liberal modernity. 
According to Williams, Morgenthau believed in national virtue, but not to the extent that 
it led to attacking other countries with power weapons. Professor of Political Science at 
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the University of Chicago, John Mearsheimer, wrote an article, “Hans Morgenthau and 
the Iraq War: realism versus neo-conservatism,” which mentions Morgenthau’s opposing 
view of neo-conservatism. As a realist, Morgenthau believed in the balance of power, to 
uphold nationalism with military power. He did not believe in spreading nationalism or 
democracy through military power, which is the belief of neo-conservatism. According to 
Mearsheimer, “There is little doubt that Morgenthau saw nationalism as a potent political 
force and, more than any other factor, it drove his opposition to the Vietnam War.”65 
While Morgenthau did influence neo-conservatism to defend the idea of nationalism, 
neo-conservatism was more inclined to represent nationalism and democracy through 
military power, as seen in Iraq War and the George W. Bush administration. Morgenthau 
believed in the balance of power, a realist perspective, and he was intent on defending 
nationalism, not spreading it.      
Schmitt’s political influence is also plainly evident in Morgenthau’s writing. In an 
effort to distance himself from Schmitt, Morgenthau was critical of Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis, which showed how Schmitt had no concern over the moral 
aspects of politics. Here Morgenthau was of a different opinion. Despite this difference, 
Schmitt’s influence on Morgenthau would eventually reappear in Morgenthau’s political 
realism, as it related to international law. As Scheuerman, Pichman, and other scholars 
convincingly argue, Morgenthau and Schmitt were closely linked. They were critical of 
political liberalism and a world state, believing that politics was defined by the nature of 
enmity between nation-states. They argued that if the U.S were to coalesce these nation-
states into a world state, it would offset the balance of these states, because it would 
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impose liberal democracy on them, and establish the U.S as an imperial power. This 
notion of political power is where Schmitt most influenced Morgenthau. Schmitt’s 
intellectual influence on Morgenthau helped him make his intellectual mark in the U.S, 
where the influence of his and Schmitt’s ideas would continue to develop among other 
conservative intellectuals.  
 
A Brief Introduction to Leo Strauss’s Life and Work 
Leo Strauss is another political intellectual who has had a significant influence on 
political theory in the U.S. He was born in a Jewish home in Germany during the early 
nineteenth century. At a young age he participated in the Zionist movement. He attended 
several German universities, where he encountered the renowned German philosophers 
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. While attending these universities he was 
introduced to neo-Kantianism, but his primary focus was in Jewish studies.66 He left 
Germany when Hitler came to power, living in England and France, before deciding to 
settle in New York where he accepted a faculty position. He later accepted a 
professorship at the University of Chicago where he wrote his famous works.  
Before discussing Strauss’s relationship to Schmitt, it is important to understand 
Strauss’s intellectual background. Eugene Sheppard’s biography, Leo Strauss and the 
Politics of Exile: The Making of a Political Philosopher, discusses the entirety of 
Strauss’s life, from his origins in Europe, to his exile in the U.S.67 Strauss’s affiliation 
with Zionism influenced how he perceived the European bourgeoisie. Sheppard makes 
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the point that Strauss from an early age was critical of Enlightenment Rationalism, 
particularly questioning the political principles emanating from the French Revolution.  
 Throughout the 1920s, Strauss gained much of his understanding of philosophy 
and political theory from Edmund Husserl, Julius Ebbinghaus, and Martin Heidegger. 
Sheppard tells of how Heidegger, especially, influenced Strauss, helping Strauss resist the 
impulse of modernizing and distorting pre-modern philosophy.68 Sheppard also discusses 
how Zionism shaped Strauss’s political beliefs. Sheppard explains that throughout the 
1920s, Strauss was consumed with how Zionism was related to the Jewish question of 
exile. Strauss devoted research throughout the 1920s to the Jewish question of exile, 
which he believed was an existential fact. Sheppard discusses how Strauss’s Weimar 
Jewish writings consistently attempted to gauge the foundations of German-Jewish 
worldviews and ideologies.69  
When Strauss arrived in the United States in 1932, his primary interest 
transitioned from Zionism to liberalism. Sheppard also discusses how Strauss was 
interested in the Jewish concept of exile in his political philosophy. Also influential in 
Strauss’s political thought was the philosophy of Moses Maimonides. Sheppard explains 
that Strauss’s research study in 1925 in Europe consisted of editing and translating the 
German writing’s of Moses Mendelssohn, also known as Moses Maimonides. Strauss 
viewed Mendelssohn as the model figure of the moderate Enlightenment.70 According to 
Sheppard, “ Strauss came to see the thought of Moses Mendelssohn as a promising 
alternative to the liberal configurations of Judaism precisely at the time that he was 
searching for an alternative paradigm in the modern sophistry of relativizing historicism 
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and liberal politics.”71 Strauss’s predilection toward Mendelssohn anticipated his 
criticism of liberalism. Strauss was critical of the Enlightenment’s victory because he 
believed it led to human arrogance. His criticism of the Enlightenment would be similar 
to Carl Schmitt’s beliefs, which eventually would have an influence on Strauss’s 
understanding of liberalism.  
The American political theorist, John Gunnell also discusses Strauss’s 
contributions to American political thought. Gunnel argues that Strauss’s work on 
Hobbes as the founder of liberalism and his research on how Hobbes had turned away 
from classical political philosophy was dimly understood in England and the U.S.72 
Different from Schmitt, Strauss believed that Hobbes was the founder of liberalism and 
the originator of the notion that the political was not natural.73 Moreover, Gunnel 
explains that political theory came to be defined by the dialogue between both sides of 
“traditional” and “scientific” theory. Strauss was critical of the scientific approach 
according to Gunnell. He explained that this new science eventually culminated in 
positivist liberal thought. Gunnell argues that Strauss attempted to present a conservative 
alternative to the degeneration of liberalism. Gunnell does not discuss much of Strauss’s 
political work, but he does offer some insight into Strauss’s political beliefs and what 
they opposed throughout the early twentieth century. Strauss’s political beliefs are pivotal 
to understanding who he was as an individual thinker and his relation to Schmitt. 
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Schmitt’s Influence on Strauss 
In this chapter we are not concerned with the entirety of Strauss’s life, but instead 
with Schmitt’s influence on Strauss’s political thought. Examining this connection will 
also help us understand how Schmitt’s political thought made its way to the U.S. It will 
also demonstrate how Schmitt’s impact on Strauss contributed to the foundation of the 
American neo-conservative movement. Many scholars have written about this 
relationship between Schmitt and Strauss, attempting to understand it either as a “hidden 
dialogue,”74 or in other ways. By examining various articles and books written about the 
relationship between Schmitt and Strauss, one will have a clearer understanding of when 
Schmitt’s American reception developed, and what part of Schmitt’s thought Strauss 
deemed important.   
In his 1994 article “Fear, Technology, and the State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, 
and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National Socialist Germany,”75 John 
McCormick addresses Schmitt and Strauss’s similarity to Thomas Hobbes. McCormick 
explains how Schmitt’s concept of the political related to Hobbes’s idea of the sovereign 
state. Schmitt agreed with Hobbes that the nature of the political was dangerous because 
human nature was corrupt, leading to greed, corruption, etc. McCormick argues that such 
a political antagonism developed in Weimar and provided the inspiration for Schmitt’s 
idea that civil war was inevitable between political factions. This antagonism also lent 
credibility to Hobbes’s concept of the state of nature. Hobbes believes that the nature of 
the state as it exists in relationship to the present is of vital concern, because of the 
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potential threat against the state. Schmitt reformulates Hobbes’s concept of the state as a 
way to undermine the Weimar Republic, and replace it with a sovereign state that would 
recognize friends and enemies. According to Schmitt, the state is a political unity, not a 
fragmented parliament, which must elect a sovereign ruler to defend the state.76  
After explaining Schmitt’s similarity to Hobbes, McCormick discusses Strauss’s 
similarity to Schmitt – a similarity based on Strauss’s acknowledgement of Schmitt’s 
revival of the state and the fear that accompanies it.77 Schmitt and Strauss agreed that 
liberalism has put the state into a critical situation, by complicating the political.78 Strauss 
also agreed with Schmitt that a different system must be created to make the political 
recognizable. McCormick shows that Strauss, however, criticized Schmitt on how to 
establish this system. Strauss believed there was a need to cultivate human nature because 
it is “morally depraved nature.” This task of educating humanity, was an approach that 
Strauss identified with Hobbes. The significant difference between Strauss and Schmitt is 
how they identify the political in relationship to human nature. Schmitt believes in the 
danger of man that is susceptible to subjectivity as well as the tendency toward neutrality 
and technology which, according to McCormick, is seen in the later Hobbes.79 Strauss, 
however, believed that an “adequate” understanding of Hobbes demonstrates how fear 
controls man. To understand how man is by nature evil is to understand how the fear of 
death, specifically a violent death, checks the evilness of human nature. Strauss believes 
that human nature has infinite desires, resulting in conflict with other men and leading to 
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inflicting pain.80 McCormick argues that Strauss had a better understanding of Hobbes’ 
theory of the state by showing that the people of a state need to be educated to be 
controlled because of their dangerous nature. This danger is where Schmitt influenced 
Strauss, understanding the “the people” as being ruled and instilling fear in them because 
of the possibility of war with other political entities.  
Toward the end of the essay, McCormick argues that Schmitt and Strauss 
attempted to supplant liberalism through a reinterpretation of Hobbes,81 but ultimately 
failed to replace liberalism. According to McCormick, they failed in two ways; first, 
because liberalism successfully succeeded Hobbes. Secondly, they failed because the 
Hobbesian myth, which Schmitt and Strauss believed was embedded in the political state 
that controlled the people, produced something disastrous in Nazism. McCormick argues 
that Schmitt and Strauss’s reformulation of the political state was no longer based on 
technology and neutralization, but on fear. Science and technology provided the 
individual with the idea of self-protection, which would be a threat to the state, leading to 
chaos of the state. Fear, in contrast, would give the state power and authority to defend 
the people. McCormick, however, argues that Schmitt and Strauss’s interpretation of the 
political state is dangerous because it was a myth that the German National Socialists 
used to instill fear into the Jews. Their position leads to an authoritarian state, increases 
technology in modern politics, and overall creates chaos within the state.  
McCormick’s essay highlights a similarity between Schmitt and Strauss’s 
political thought in regards to Hobbes’ theory of the state. His essay also addresses how 
Schmitt’s American reception impacted Strauss. In what follows we shall see that there 
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are different explanations of the relationship between Schmitt and Strauss, depending on 
which aspect of Schmitt’s thought was receiving attention among American scholars. 
  In his 1997 article: “From Legitimacy to Dictatorship – and Back Again: Leo 
Strauss’s Critique of the Anti-Liberalism of Carl Schmitt,”82 Robert Howse examines 
Strauss’s debts to Schmitt. Howse attempts to explain what Strauss intended when he 
argued for a “horizon beyond liberalism,” as well as how Strauss’s relationship to 
Schmitt sheds light on Schmitt’s concept of the political. Howse explains that Strauss’s 
note on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political showed that Schmitt had a moral intention 
behind his political theories. Schmitt lacked, however, the understanding “that the moral 
intention was the moralization of the will to power.”83 Schmitt’s moral intention, 
according to Howse, developed from Machiavelli. Howse later examines Schmitt’s 
influence on Strauss, with Strauss believing in the need for decisionism. Strauss believed 
that the sovereign of the state must be able to serve equitably, resist using power to 
corrupt the law, regardless of whether he was a wise or unwise ruler. It is the character of 
sovereignty that decides the exception. Furthermore, Strauss argues that classic natural 
right is part of the decision, in distinguishing friend and enemy. Classic natural right calls 
for individual rights, a general set of rules, according to Howse. These rules, Schmitt 
believed, were embedded in the distinction between friend and enemy, legitimizing these 
rules in accord with society. Strauss, however, believed that the decision undermined 
classic natural right, by sacrificing what is good for man to the demand for politics. 
Howse concludes his article by showing that Strauss was more inclined toward 
classic natural right, which shifted politics toward human perfection and closed societies, 
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but also that he accepted the friend-enemy distinction.84 Whereas Schmitt believed in 
classic natural right with a decision that decides the rules, Strauss defends the idea of 
classic natural right with a hierarchy of ends, as a legitimate end of politics.85 Howse’s 
overall intent is to present Strauss’s belief in classical natural right as an alternative to 
Schmitt’s decision that disregards the good of the people for the sake of violence. These 
differences aside, Strauss’s reading of Schmitt’s concept of the sovereign decision, 
influenced his interpretation of the exception. By affirming classical natural rights, 
Strauss affirms Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, while also adding his own perspective 
to it. Howse presents Strauss’s emphasis on classic natural right as a way beyond 
Schmitt’s belief in war between friend and enemies. It was a way to find balance between 
the public safety of man and the “cultivation of human excellence,”86 according to 
Howse. Overall, this article addresses Schmitt’s political influence on Strauss, regarding 
the concept of friend and enemy and the sovereign decision. It shows how Schmitt’s 
influenced Strauss but also how Strauss went beyond what Schmitt was able to realize.  
Heinrich Meier’s Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue87 is a 
closer study of the relationship between Schmitt and Strauss and Schmitt’s influence on 
Strauss. Meier’s work is one of the few sources to clearly articulate Strauss’s relationship 
to Schmitt and to provide an understanding of what Strauss learned from Schmitt. First 
published in 1988 in Germany, Meier’s study attempts to shed light on this relationship 
by explaining how Strauss’s criticisms of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political were 
eventually addressed by Schmitt in the third edition of The Concept of the Political. 
                                                        
84 Ibid., 101.  
85 Ibid., 99.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Heinrich Meier, The Hidden Dialogue. 
  35 
Moreover, Meier suggests that Schmitt believed that Strauss knew him better than anyone 
else.88 But more than a clear language spoken between Schmitt and Strauss, Meier also 
argues that there was a silent dialogue between these scholars. For example, in his 1933 
edition of The Concept of the Political, Strauss never mentioned whom he was in 
dialogue with.89  
Meier begins his book by showing that Strauss only wrote on three of his 
contemporaries: Alexandre Kojève, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt.90 Meier’s 
intention is to show how Schmitt influenced Strauss’s interpretation of political theory. 
Meier is interested in finding what part of Schmitt’s influence specifically took hold of 
Strauss. According to Meier: “…what primarily interested Strauss in writing on The 
Concept of the Political is to complete the critique of liberalism.”91 Strauss was 
concerned with how Schmitt criticized the concept of nature, how he interpreted the 
nature of politics, and why he was so critical of liberalism. Meier explains early on that 
Schmitt revised his The Concept of the Political based on Strauss’s critique of Schmitt’s 
work, suggesting that Strauss was interested in what Schmitt wrote on liberalism.  
Meier argues that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism was motivated by his religious 
background as a Catholic, which informed his critique of modern culture and which, in 
turn, influenced Strauss’s critique of the philosophy of culture in terms of the immorality 
of human nature. Strauss believes that human nature “precedes and underlines every 
culture,”92 according to Meier. In regards to Schmitt’s interpretation of political nature, 
specifically concerning his concept of friend and enemy, Schmitt believed the enemy 
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defined politics because human nature was corrupt. Yet, for Strauss, human nature could 
be controlled, despite its corruption. Although Schmitt appropriated some of Hobbes’s 
political thought, Strauss followed Hobbes more closely, supporting his idea that the state 
of nature is a war of individuals. Schmitt, however, believes the ‘state of nature’ was 
recognized as a state of war of groups (nation-states).93 Strauss believes that the state can 
justifiably demand individuals’ obedience, as long as it does not contradict the 
preservation of their lives.94 Schmitt, quite differently, believes the state is the 
authoritative power as a nation-state. In recognizing the power of the state, Meier 
believes that Strauss turns to Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes to strike at the root of 
liberalism in order to preserve the authority of the state against the enemy. Meier argues 
that Strauss’s interest in Schmitt’s critique of liberalism gave Strauss directions on how 
to criticize liberalism, in Hobbesian fashion, as a critique of the bourgeois notion of 
individual control rather than state authority.  
Meier goes on to show how Schmitt and Strauss each influence each other in their 
views of the state of nature. This is clearly understood when Meier states:  
Schmitt’s affirmation of the political, in Strauss’s interpretation, is the affirmation of the ‘state of 
nature.’ The affirmation of the ‘state of nature’ as the status belli simply is not intended to be 
bellicose, however, and thus does not signify the affirmation of war. Schmitt is concerned, rather, 
with the ‘relinquishment of the security of the status quo.95   
 
To protect the security of the state, Schmitt and Strauss are in agreement in disapproving 
of a world-state, aimed toward comfort and security, with faith in technology, which 
eliminates the idea that man is by nature evil. For Schmitt and Strauss, friend and enemy, 
not the idealistic notion of universal peace, must define the political, or else the political 
would cease to exist. Once again Meier argues that Schmitt’s understanding of the 
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political is based on his religious belief. Meier makes this argument in the Hidden 
Dialogue when he writes: “Ultimately, for Schmitt the affirmation of the political is 
nothing but the affirmation of the moral. But Schmitt sees the affirmation of the moral as 
itself based in the theological. For him the affirmation of the moral is part of his political 
theology.”96 Meier contends that Schmitt’s belief in the “decision” was predicated upon a 
determination between good and evil. Whereas Schmitt opposed a world-state because it 
would be an “ungodly attempt to construct paradise on earth,” Strauss rejects the notion 
of a world-state because he sees it as Nietzsche’s “last man.”97 According to Meier, 
Strauss’s dialogue with Schmitt revealed Schmitt as a political theologian because of 
Strauss’s comments in the later editions of The Concept of the Political. For instance, 
Strauss’s comments in Schmitt’s later edition of The Concept of the Political provided 
more substance to Schmitt’s belief in the evil nature of man. Meier argues that Strauss’s 
comments on Schmitt’s critique of liberalism indicate who Schmitt was – a political 
theologian. Schmitt’s theological influence is noted in the Hidden Dialogue when Meier 
argues that Schmitt and Strauss disagreed on neutralization and “depoliticization.” Meier 
explains that Schmitt’s arguments were based on political theology, whereas Strauss 
relied on political philosophy. Schmitt’s theology leads to his critique of liberalism, but it 
is also motivated by Strauss’s critique of Schmitt’s interpretation of liberalism.  
Meier is mostly concerned with how Schmitt positioned himself in relation to 
liberalism. In the final two chapters of Meier’s Hidden Dialogue, he gives more attention 
to Strauss’s critique of Schmitt’s interpretation of liberalism. Meier argues that Schmitt’s 
criticism of liberalism was antireligious because it eliminated the concept of a sovereign 
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leader. Schmitt believed that universal peace, which was embedded in liberalism, denied 
human evil, and therefore denied the inevitability of war.  
Overall, Meier believes that Schmitt regarded the sovereign decision as an act of 
faith based on political theology. Rejecting the theological underpinnings of Schmitt’s 
thought, Strauss argues that there was a need to look beyond liberalism, to look to 
Thomas Hobbes for a greater understanding of the state. For Strauss, Hobbes represented 
the foundation for understanding liberalism. Meier concludes with the argument that: 
“The friends that Strauss chose for himself tell us much more about his identity, and it 
becomes visible nowhere else than in his philosophy.”98 Meier argues that Strauss chose 
to separate himself from Schmitt’s political theology. To a greater extent, Meier argues 
that Strauss was more concerned with politics and human nature than with the idea of 
enmity between nation-states, believing that his interest in Schmitt was based on how the 
political should be defined.  
There is very little doubt that Hans Morgenthau and Leo Strauss were deeply 
influenced by Carl Schmitt’s political thought. Morgenthau and Strauss were affected by 
Schmitt’s theory of power politics. His encounter with Schmitt would have a strong 
influence on Morgenthau. He would eventually write his own formulation of The 
Concept of the Political. Although he never encountered Schmitt, Strauss was engaged 
seriously with what Schmitt wrote. Meier explains that Strauss’s dialogue with Schmitt 
was through letters, showing that Strauss influenced Schmitt, which resulted in the 
addition of Strauss’s notes in The Concept of the Political. Schmitt’s impact on 
Morgenthau and Strauss illustrates how Schmitt’s political thought was introduced into 
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the U.S. Schmitt’s presence in the work of Morgenthau and Strauss was only the 
beginning of Schmitt’s reception in the U.S, as well shall see in the following chapter.  
 
Chapter II 
Discovering the Connection Between Carl Schmitt and the 
American Leftist Journal Telos 
The Leftist journal Telos was founded in 1968, and focused primarily during its 
first decade on the Frankfurt School and Western Marxism.99 When it began publishing 
essays during the late 1980s about the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt, it 
marked a significant change for it to take seriously a political opponent of the Left, or 
what many Leftist scholars considered a counter-revolutionary. In short, it seemed odd.  
When Telos published an essay in 1987 by Ellen Kennedy, “Carl Schmitt and the 
Frankfurt School,”100 it made clear that Schmitt was not completely disregarded among 
modern political theorists on the Left. Kennedy’s essay is especially important to 
understanding how Schmitt’s writings were initially received in Telos. For Kennedy’s 
essay would be the first of many published in Telos about Schmitt’s concept of politics. 
During the late 1980s a number of essays published in Telos gradually show how 
Schmitt, once perceived as an enemy of the political Left, was beginning to find 
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favorable recognition from them. What had changed in Telos from 1968 to 1987 to lead 
to such positive interest in Schmitt? One possible reason that will be explored here is that 
his arrival in Telos was a symptom of a crisis on the political Left, which was searching 
for alternatives to Marxism during the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. 
For many leftist scholars involved with Telos, Schmitt seemed to provide insight into 
restructuring leftist theory.     
Before addressing Schmitt’s reception in Telos, it is important to understand how 
the journal originated in the late-1960s, and how it developed in the 1970s to mid-1980s. 
By identifying some of the main themes that emerged in Telos during its first two 
decades, one can better understand why Schmitt first appeared in its pages in 1987.  
 
Telos before Schmitt: Paul Piccone and his purpose for Telos: 1968-1980 
 Beginning in 1968, Telos published essays about Western European philosophies, 
especially Western Marxism. Paul Piccone (1940-2004) the editorial leader and founder 
of Telos, initially started the journal in Buffalo, New York as a graduate student with 
other graduate students.101 These graduate students wrote essays about political and 
philosophical subjects, which questioned “… the common beliefs about the Cold War, 
leftist mass politics, sixties’ radicalism, modern research universities, American 
democracy, Eastern European Communism, popular culture, the expanding European 
Union, and the New Left.”102 Telos was published quarterly with various Leftist scholars 
contributing essays on themes concerning social and critical theory.  
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Although Telos published essays by a wide variety of scholars, this study places 
an emphasis on Piccone’s essays. Since he was the founder and acknowledged leader of 
Telos, his essays offer the most insight into the overall direction of Telos. His essays also 
reveal his influence on Telos from when it first formed, to when it gradually changed in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and when it began to turn to Carl Schmitt in 1987. Moreover, this 
chapter will also examine essays by Jürgen Habermas, Martin Jay, Max Horkeimer, 
Russell Jacoby, Theodor Adorno,103 and Andrew Arato because of their frequent 
appearance in Telos. By reviewing these essays of Piccone’s, and others by leftist 
scholars during the 1970s and 1980s, one gains insight into the social and political 
theories – Western Marxism, Italian Marxism, Frankfurt School Critical Theory, 
Socialism, etc., –that defined Telos. How Telos defined itself is crucial to understanding 
how these ideas eventually led to their interest in Carl Schmitt.   
In the spring of 1968, Telos published their first issue. Included in this issue was 
an essay by Paul Piccone titled: “Towards a Socio-Historical Interpretation of the 
Scientific Revolution.”104 His essay addresses Husserl’s study of the crisis of European 
science105 as it relates to the individual in a developing capitalistic society.106 Piccone’s 
essay shows his purpose for Telos by contesting old theories about the scientific 
revolution, especially the seeming paradox of how the scientific revolution has led to 
irrational thinking. He cites Italian philosopher, Antonio Banfi, to explain this 
irrationalism in society. Furthermore, Piccone argues that Husserl’s study of subjective 
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human rationality was determined by the European sciences, similar to Marx’s analysis 
of capitalist development, which shows the irrationality of modern society. Husserl’s 
argument was that the scientific revolution in the sixteenth century reduced the concrete 
man, a rational man, to a spectator that emerges in a class-driven society.107 Piccone 
believes that the scientific revolution produced irrational thinking, an “objective capitalist 
world-order.”108 Piccone believes there was a need to study the counter-revolution against 
the scientific revolution, to return to human subjectivity.109 He expresses a concern for 
the rational concrete man, who is reduced to a spectator by a new ruling class.  
In the second issue in the fall of 1968, Telos turned its attention to the notion of 
the dialectic. Piccone examined the dialectic of the West in his essay: “Dialectical Logic 
Today.”110 His essay argues that dialectical logic has become irrational. It has become 
corrupted in the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, and given birth to two 
contradictory ideologies: Communism and Capitalism. Throughout the essay, Piccone 
traces the history of the dialectic, in regards to dynamism, teleology, objectivity, etc. He 
argues that there is a need to find concreteness in a class-driven society, specifically 
during the nineteenth-century bourgeois society. He believes that the solution lies in a 
Marxist analysis that provides a concrete theory of the conflicting classes. Piccone’s early 
essays indicate how the development of science was abstract, and thus posed a threat to 
the concrete individual.  
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In the fall issue of 1969, Piccone wrote an essay titled: “Students’ Protest, Class 
Structure, and Ideology,”111 which focuses on the proletarian class struggle and its 
relation to students’ protest. Piccone presents the students’ movement as a weak 
alternative to the bourgeoisie and the developing American industries. The students’ 
protest was an attempt to provide an alternative to the labor unions’ bureaucratized 
leaders. Yet, according to Piccone, it requires being theoretical, as more than student 
protesters frustrated by an affluent society.112 He explains how the student movement 
must critique the objective conditions, including the labor unions as part of a class-driven 
society, without sacrificing the goal for a rational society. There must be different 
projects to achieve a just world order, such as that advocated by Western Marxism, to 
which Piccone and other scholars would soon direct their attention. At the end of the 
1960s, Piccone addressed the effects of a global economy – the underdevelopment of the 
Third World and a war economy – that he believed needed a new perspective beyond an 
ideological student movement.   
During the 1970s, Telos continued to attract the interest of leftist scholars, who 
contributed essays that often reflected the crisis of the U.S. and world economy, the 
problems in Soviet Communism, and the development of socialism in other countries. 
Many Telos authors also expressed their interest in Western Marxism, which had existed 
since the 1920s. They believed Western Marxism might provide political and theoretical 
guidance to a political Left that was no longer revolutionary.   
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Telos through the 1970s 
Piccone’s essay in 1970: “The Problem of Consciousness,”113 was his explanation 
of how class consciousness and Western Marxism are interconnected. Critical of the 
Soviet Union’s concept of Marxism, it stressed the importance of Georg Lukács’s theory 
of consciousness for Western Marxism. In his essay, Piccone reexamines the origins of 
Western Marxism and provides an opportunity for other leftist scholars involved with 
Telos to reintroduce this theoretical tradition. Piccone focuses primarily on the Hegelian 
component of Marxism. He reintroduces Western Marxism as an alternative to the Soviet 
Union’s version of Marxism (Communism), as well as an alternative way to interpret 
global economic struggles.  
In the early 1970s, Russell Jacoby, a historian at UCLA and a critic of academic 
culture, became an important figure at Telos, who also contributed essays in support of 
Western Marxism. In his first essay for Telos in 1970, “Marcuse and the New Academics: 
a Note on Style,”114 Jacoby defends Marcuse’s support of Marxism from the harsh critics 
that opposed him.115 As a member of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse’s writing figured 
prominently in Telos. Leftist scholars involved with Telos would often publish essays 
about the Frankfurt School, which specialized in critical social theory.  
 In the Fall issue of 1970, Telos introduced the French philosopher, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, with his essay, “Western Marxism.”116 He begins by asking, “How can 
relativism be overcome?”117 According to Merleau-Ponty, Max Weber believed that 
                                                        
113 Ibid. 
114 Russell Jacoby, “Marcuse and the New Academics: A Note on Style,” Telos 5, no. 5 (Spring 1970): 188-
190. 
115 Ibid., 188. 
116 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Western Marxism,” Telos 6, no. 6 (Fall 1970), 141-161. 
117 Ibid., 141. 
  45 
relativism is determined by historicity and, in particular, by how the individual is 
perceived objectively or subjectively within a larger social totality.118 Weber’s student, 
Georg Lukács, argued that the concept of totality shows all the facts that have been given 
to us as history, and then as philosophy. Lukács recognized this philosophy as Marxism. 
He believed that event and meaning is the essence of Marxism as a dialectical 
philosophy. Merleau-Ponty presents Lukács’s concept of Marxism to show how 
relativism can be overcome. Marxism offers an awareness of time, without describing the 
future.119 Merleau-Ponty ultimately argues that to understand the purpose of Marxism is 
to see where Communism has gone wrong. He argues, however, that the path of 
Communism is perhaps a way of showing that true Marxism, of political, social, or 
economic analysis, is still being constructed.120                
Lukács’s concept of Marxism was also discussed in the Spring issue of 1971, 
when Telos introduced the political and social theorist, Andrew Arato, with his essay: 
“Lukács' Path to Marxism (1910 – 1923).”121 His essay explains how Lukács’s dislike for 
the Hungarian intellectuals led him to an admiration of the West. Arato focuses on Georg 
Simmel’s influence on Lukács with his book Philosophie des Geldes.122 Simmel 
displayed an affinity to Marx, especially with regard to the subjective and objective 
conditions of individuality in a class-driven society. Arato concludes his essay by 
showing how Lukács, after the First World War, became a firm advocate of revolutionary 
socialism. Eventually, Lukács’s awareness of class conflict, the solidarity and alienation 
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of the proletariat, and the reification of all aspects of life, would lead him to Marxism. 
Arato’s essay is another example of how Marxism was seen in Telos during the 1970s. It 
showed how Western Marxism figured prominently in Telos with leftist scholars 
contributing essays about how it provided theoretical insight into contemporary social 
conflicts. 
In the Spring issue of 1972, Telos continued publishing essays on Western 
Marxism. In that issue, Andrew Arato wrote an essay, “Lukács’s Theory of 
Reification,”123 which presents reification as part of the dialectical theory of society. He 
also examines reification in regards to Marxism. By examining this concept, Arato draws 
upon Lukács’s History as Class Consciousness to describe Marxism and reification as 
useful theoretical tools to analyze 1970s society and culture.  
In the previous year, in the Summer issue of 1971, Telos introduced the German-
Jewish philosopher and social theorist, Herbert Marcuse, with his essay, “The Concept of 
Negation in the Dialectic,”124 which addresses the value of Marxian theory in a 
capitalistic society.125 As a prominent critical social theorist, and an original member of 
the Institute for Social Research,126 Marcuse’s contribution to Telos showed how 
Piccone’s journal was receiving scholarly attention during the 1970s, rapidly gaining the 
attention of leftist scholars that promoted Western Marxism as well as Frankfurt School 
Critical Theory.  
As Telos’s interest in Western Marxism continued into the 1970s, Russell Jacoby 
contributed another essay in the Summer issue of 1971: “The Politics of Subjectivity: 
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Notes on Marxism, the Movement, the Bourgeois Society.”127 Jacoby describes how the 
political scene during the 1970s has disintegrated, except Marxist sects.128 Jacoby wrote 
another essay in the Winter issue of 1971 that further addressed the issue of Marxism: 
“Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács to 
the Frankfurt School.”129 Jacoby argues that Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy as well as 
Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, both published in 1923, are still valuable for 
critical social theorists. Korsch and Lukács during the 1920s were at different times in 
opposition to the Communist party in Russia, which affected their idea of Western 
Marxism. For similar reasons, the Frankfurt school existed outside the Communist party. 
Jacoby ultimately believes that Lukács and the Frankfurt School demonstrate how 
Marxism remains important for contemporary critical social theory.     
Piccone also addresses Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness in his essay: 
“Dialectic and Materialism in Lukács.”130 Piccone argues that, when the new translations 
of Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness were published in 1961, 1967, and 1971, it 
reopened the debate concerning the foundations of Western Marxism.131 In other words, 
Piccone’s theoretical interests, which influenced the direction of Telos, lay primarily in 
Western Marxism, especially after the new translations of Lukács’ History and Class 
Consciousness were published. These new translations influenced many Leftist scholars 
to write essays for Telos on the foundation and theoretical value of Western Marxism.   
                                                        
127 Russell Jacoby, “The Politics of Subjectivity: Notes on Marxism, the Movement, the Bourgeois 
Society,” Telos 9, no. 9 (Fall 1971): 116-126. 
128 Ibid., 117. 
129 Russell Jacoby, “Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács to 
the Frankfurt School,” Telos 9, no. 9 (Winter 1971): 119-146. 
130 Paul Piccone, “Dialectic and Materialism in Lukács,” Telos 11, no. 11 (Spring 1972): 105-133. 
131 Ibid., 117. 
  48 
In 1974, Telos published an essay by Martin Jay, “The Frankfurt School’s 
Critique of Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge,” in which he discussed 
how the non-Marxist Mannheim’s concept of the sociology of knowledge was 
inadequately refuted by Frankfurt School figures. According to Jay, Horkheimer and his 
colleagues were closely involved with the concept of the sociology of knowledge, in part 
because it was a source of value to Marxist thinkers in contrast to relativism.132 The essay 
mostly focuses on how Mannheim’s book, Ideology and Utopia, was an attack against 
Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness. Jay ultimately believes that the Frankfurt 
School understood how fragments of history present a perspective of the future, yet 
without a true conclusive solution, which ultimately does not refute the doctrine of the 
sociology of knowledge. Jay’s essay is part of the overall theme of showing how 
important Lukács’s analysis of Marxism as well as the Frankfurt School were to Telos.   
In the Spring of 1974, Telos published the first essay by the German philosopher 
and social theorist, Jürgen Habermas, “On Social Identity.” Habermas argues that the 
structure of society will one day crystalize into a new society – a rationality that will 
create a non-prejudiced society.133 He presents two reasons to justify his rational society: 
a rational society that is dependent on a collective identity, which is “…grounded in the 
consciousness of the universal and equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-
forming learning processes.”134 Habermas’s essay appears grounded in Western Marxist 
and leftist values, which signified the direction of Telos during the mid-1970s.  
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In the Fall issue of 1974, Telos published another essay by Andrew Arato: “The 
Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity.” Arato argues that to truly understand the 
development of Marxism after Marx, one must study Neo-Kantianism, which he believes 
was influential in the creation of modern Critical Theory.135 By tracing this lineage, he 
focuses on how the creation of Neo-Kantianism led to problems concerning subjectivity. 
Specifically, Arato shows how any study of subjectivity must involve a critique of 
positivism, with its claims to objectivity, and it dismissal of subjectivity. He presents the 
development of positivism through the nineteenth-century. Arato then introduces the anti-
positivist and German sociologists: Max Weber, Wilhelm Windleband, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
and Georg Simmel, to explain their theories of duality of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Arato focuses on these figures to show how Western Marxism, stemming from Lukács’ 
History and Class Consciousness, developed through Neo-Kantianism to the Frankfurt 
School.   
For the 1975 Spring issue of Telos, Russell Jacoby wrote an essay: “The Politics 
of the Crisis Theory: Toward the Critique of Automatic Marxism,”136 that presents a 
further defense of Western Marxism and explains how this theoretical tradition had 
developed since Marx. Jacoby writes about the crisis of capitalism as well as the intrusion 
of positivism against Marxism. For Jacoby, the ideas of subjectivity and Marxism present 
a solution that points beyond capitalism. It was capitalism that was once controlled by a 
fascist state, an authoritarian state. He believes that the “crisis theory” is an example of 
how it is inevitable for a capitalist system to collapse. Horkheimer and Marcuse are 
referenced in the essay to show the contradictions in how a capitalistic society 
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progressively changes. Yet, it is this change, according to Jacoby, that can explode a 
capitalistic society. He ultimately believes that the solution lies in further defending the 
value of Western Marxism.   
In the Winter issue of 1976, Telos republished an essay by Karl Korsch: “Ten 
Theses on Marxism Today,”137 which was originally published in 1950. Korsch 
emphasized the need for a Marxist theory of society. He outlines what he thinks are the 
important aspects of Marxist thought. He specifically argues that for Marxism to be 
relevant as a critical social theory it must break away from its previous revolutionary 
initiative. For Korsch, workers must gain control over their lives. He argues that: “This 
control can only result from a planned intervention by all the classes today excluded from 
it into a production which today is already tending in every way to be regulated in a 
monopolistic and planned fashion.”138 He believes that by studying the different goals of 
Marxism, as it existed on a world scale, it will provide insight into a destructive capitalist 
society.  
Telos maintained their focus on Western Marxism and the Frankfurt School into 
1977, with an essay by Martin Jay: “The Concept of Totality in Lukács and Adorno.” In 
his essay, Jay argues that Adorno’s critique of Lukács’ concept of Western Marxism 
allows for a new epoch of Marxism to emerge. Specifically, Jay examines the clash 
between Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, 
and how it affects Marxists today.139 Jay also shows the connection between Adorno and 
Louis Althusser’s critiques of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, particularly his 
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concept of totality.140 The overall purpose of Jay’s essay, however, is to show the 
transformation of totality from 1923, when Lukács reintroduced it, to Marxism in the 
1960s, when Adorno reformulated it.  
Telos continued to publish essays about the origin and influence of Western 
Marxism and the Frankfurt School. The essays by Jay, Piccone, Arato, Habermas, and 
others continued to address themes concerning the concepts of subjectivity and 
objectivity, Western Marxism, the Frankfurt School, the concept of totality, etc. These 
themes represented an attempt to show how the position of the political Left could be 
reinvigorated. These themes also demonstrated how much Telos would change its 
political interests when it turned to Schmitt.   
In the Winter issue of 1978, Jacoby wrote an essay for Telos titled: “The Politics 
of Objectivity: Notes on the U.S. Left,” addressing how the political Left had become lost 
in Marxism-Leninism or Stalinism. According to Jacoby, “Stalinism is the adult disorder 
of the infantile left.”141 The New Left was far less revolutionary and rather passive, 
comprised of “sissy students” and “pre-scientific intellectuals.”142 The political Left has 
vested its energy in the pursuit of reviving Marxism in higher education that may be only 
a bubble.143 The political Left’s opaqueness is because of its past reckless involvement 
with revolutionary motives. For Jacoby, there is a need to look beyond the Left’s 
Marxism-Leninism, and the New Left’s student protests, because they have resulted in 
political fragmentation among the Left.   
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In the Spring issue of 1978, Telos published Piccone’s essay: “The Crisis of One-
Dimensionality.”144 He argues that the Frankfurt School theorists failed to explain the 
socio-political nature of Stalinism and fascism.145 According to Piccone, their failure to 
provide a socio-political theory of Stalinism and fascism resulted in their reluctance to 
give up traditional Marxist theory.146 This failure, however, led to what Piccone 
described as an “objectivistic cancer for Marxist theory,” from which it would never 
recover. Furthermore, Piccone argues that: “one-dimensionality meant the domination of 
collective capital over every facet of everyday life.”147 In contrast to the capitalist system, 
Piccone believes there should be a reexamination of socialism that explains why it has 
been subverted by the Bolshevik tradition. 
The Spring 1979 Telos issue addressed the value of Habermas’s thought for 
Marxism. In the introductory essay of that issue, Arato, Piccone, and James Schmidt 
outline the problems and the promise of Habermas’s thought on social evolution. 
Habermas’s 1976 essay, “History and Evolution,” was republished in an English 
translation by Telos. In their introductory essay, Arato, Piccone, and Schmidt state that 
Habermas’s essay was, “…an impressive attempt to inform critical theory with the results 
of empirical inquiries in contemporary social science – an effort that proceeds much in 
the spirit of Marx’s critical appropriation of political economy.”148 Furthermore, essays 
by Axel Honneth, Adolph Reed, and other scholars in that issue are a reflection or a 
response to Habermas’s thought on history and evolution, particularly with some scholars 
who are critical of his evolutionary perspective. In their introductory essay, Arato, 
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Piccone, and Schmidt argue that Habermas’s “evolutionary turn” represents a major 
achievement because “…it calls into question the Marxist clichés that often pass as 
critical theory without abandoning Marx’s central commitment to an emancipatory social 
theory.”149 Habermas’s essay is, in short, part of the consistent trajectory with the themes 
in Telos during the 1970s.  
Habermas’s essay: “History and Evolution,” begins by addressing the traditional 
ways to analyze history. He believes, however, that evolutionary theory on 
“contemporary social formations” can help developmental problems beyond traditional 
method.150 He specifically mentions how Marcuse, Freyer, and Bell’s theories were 
overlooked from past perspectives, but now their theories need to be overcome to address 
more progressive theories of Marxism. Overall, Habermas argues that there is a need for 
a contemporary perspective on evolutionary theory, to understand a Marxist view of 
advanced capitalism that creates problems in the social system.151 
In the Winter issue of 1979-1980, Telos published an essay by an unfamiliar 
scholar, Antonio Carlo: “The Italian Crisis and the Role of the Left.” In his essay, Carlo 
argues that from 1976-1979, Italy was weakened by an economic collapse, which he 
believes was caused by labor struggles and the rise of labor costs, inadequate planning, 
and the general underdevelopment of Italy.152 He also maintains that certain reform 
initiatives by the political Left could revive the economy. Yet, Carlo believes that the 
Italian left must change toward a stance closer to the traditional Left for any valuable 
reform to occur. Ultimately, Carlo suggests that only through “radical anti-capitalist 
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politics” will the Left be able to find positive direction. He believes that the Italian 
Communist party must find anti-capitalist solutions, to strengthen the Left, rather than 
being criticized by them. Carlo discusses the problems in Communism, which weakens 
the Left. His essay is another example of why Telos’s interest in the question of how to 
revive the political Left.   
With themes mostly comprised of Western Marxism, economic crisis, and the 
Frankfurt School critical social theory, Telos was earning its reputation as a leftist 
journal. It had attracted diverse leftist scholars that included Habermas, Jay, Jacoby, and 
Marcuse. These scholars contributed essays that defined the scope of Telos as a Marxist 
journal, concerned with critical theory, as well as contemporary social issues. As the 
founder of Telos, Piccone had created a path for others to follow. Beginning in the 1980s, 
Piccone and other scholars would find a different direction. Their eagerness to introduce 
Western Marxism into American culture would abate because of the social and political 
issues that would arise in the 1980s, which would force them to further reexamine leftist 
values, and would eventually lead them to an unlikely character – Carl Schmitt. We have 
just seen, however, that the themes that emerged in Telos during the 1970s indicate that 
the political Left was not yet interested in Schmitt. A further examination of the essays in 
Telos during the 1980s will show that political and social crises arose that would lead to a 
divide among Leftist scholars regarding the value of Schmitt’s political theories. These 
essays in Telos will, in other words, reveal that his arrival in Telos was not arbitrary, but 
rather indicative of how weakened and desperate the political Left became during the 
1980s.   
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Telos during the early-1980s: Crisis on the Left 
During the early 1980s, Telos published many essays on American social 
movements and the crises of Communism in Eastern Europe. Telos was also developing 
an interest in the Soviet Union, beginning with some of the journal’s issues published in 
1984. It is important to understand the direction of Telos between 1980 and 1987, 
because of the surprising shift to Schmitt in 1987. Understanding the themes that were 
prevalent in Telos before Schmitt’s introduction, will provide comparative insight into 
how he was regarded in the essays that Telos published after 1987 and, eventually, into 
the 1990s.  
In the Summer of 1980, Telos dedicated a special issue to the German-Jewish 
sociologist and Frankfurt School figure, Leo Lowenthal. Included in this issue was an 
essay by Russell Jacoby: “What is Conformist Marxism.”153 Jacoby focuses on orthodox 
Marxism, and why he believes that orthodox Marxism has not been successful. He argues 
that its failure is because of its reliance on science to determine the condition of a 
particular society. Furthermore, Jacoby cites the French Marxist, Louis Althusser, who 
believed that Marxism has been disregarded because of its historical place in time – an 
idea that was originally derived from Karl Marx, who believed that his philosophy would 
only succeed in a particular historical situation. Jacoby argues that orthodox Marxism 
relies too much on the science of society to understand the struggles in a capitalistic 
society. Rather, science and other aspects of past Marxist thought have only created a 
disreputable name for Marxism. Althusser believed, however, that the failure in Marxism 
does not prove anything.154 Jacoby, who agreed with Althusser on this point, concludes 
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by suggesting that these past failures of Marxist thought, must be recollected and worked 
through to rediscover the value of Marxism.        
1981 signified a change in Telos. This change is reflected in an essay by Paul 
Piccone and Russell Jacoby during the early 1980s, which addressed the crisis on the 
Left. It is especially important to understand that Piccone and Jacoby’s essays, as well as 
other essays between 1980 and 1987, reveal a change from what Telos had been 
publishing in the late 1960s and 1970s. Before 1980, Telos had consistently published 
essays about the positive social and political potential of Western Marxism. But Western 
Marxism would begin to receive critical attention from Paul Piccone and others leftist 
scholars involved with Telos. 
In one of the more revealing essays that addresses the collapse of the Left, “Why 
did the Left Collapse?”155 Piccone presents the problems that had emerged among the 
Left.  Published in the Winter issue of the 1980-1981, his essay is an examination of the 
crises among the Left in the light of multiple recent setbacks: Ronald Reagan’s victory, 
the collapse of Eurocommunism and, especially, the faded effectiveness of Marxism and 
anarchism.156 He argues that a reevaluation of the political Left will show that it has 
become “conformist” and “uncritical.”157 It has failed to adapt to modern social reality. 
According to Piccone, the development of “corporativist” politics in which, political 
parties opt for state power, undermined the Left’s ability to radicalize, and led it instead 
to conform to capitalist rationalization. Piccone believes that the “homogenization of 
consciousness and the corporatization of politics tend to be ultimately incompatible.”158 
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Nonetheless, in recent times the combination of homogenization and corporatization has 
“absorbed” the political Left. Moreover, he argues that since the New Deal project of 
social reconstruction, the political Left has degenerated.159 He elaborates by stating: “In 
all of these issues and more, the political Left takes a stand with the Welfare State and 
remains silent. As an agency of homogenization or corporatization, it thus ends up sliding 
into the conformist logic of different modes of capitalist rationalization.”160 In short, 
Piccone argues that the political Left’s inability to confront the inequality of classes and 
the welfare state has led it to become stagnant. It is a crisis that shows that the political 
Left has accepted capitalist rationalization.  
Piccone does offer, however, an alternative to the collapse of the political Left. 
This alternative involves Lukács’s Soul and the Forms, Gramsci’s La Città Futura, and 
Bloch’s The Spirit of Utopia. According to Piccone, Lukács, Gramsci, and Bloch’s vision 
translates into a “vindication of that subjectivist quasi-religious precategorical 
dimension,” which has not yet and never will fully capitulate to the logic of the institution 
but which all too easily and often falls prey to it.161 Similarly, the Left has fallen prey to 
capitalist rationalization. He believes there was a need to reverse social homogenization 
through short-term projects toward “Community Development Corporations,” rather than 
accept the welfare state as a solution to the capitalist crisis, when it is actually an 
extension of this crisis. Piccone argues that the Left must “reappropriate” and radicalize 
the Right’s critique. Telos would find a way to confront the left’s uncritical acceptance of 
welfare-state liberalism. This anticipates Telos’s future interest in Schmitt and his critique 
of political liberalism.  
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In the Winter 1980-1981 issue of Telos, Russell Jacoby also contributed an essay: 
“The Crisis of the Left?”162 In this short three-page essay, Jacoby addresses how the Left 
has changed from 1968 to 1980, partly because of a lack of leadership since Herbert 
Marcuse and Isaac Deutscher. Jacoby also argues that part of this weakness is because 
Marxism is confined to academics, arguing that academic Marxism is not the whole of 
the Left.163 For Jacoby, the Left represented radicalism – a future revolution – beyond the 
minority groups fighting for equality. Moreover, while the Left reinforces academic 
Marxism, it is void of any real impact against racism, poverty, and discrimination. For 
Jacoby, the struggles within the Left have occurred since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, referring to the crisis of Marxism in 1899, when Labriola attacked it. Beyond the 
Left’s stagnation, Jacoby believes that “partial struggles,” which consist of separate rights 
and interests, keep alive the political activity and commitment of the political Left.  
Jacoby and Piccone’s essays are important to understand the connection between 
Telos and Schmitt. If the Left was severely weakened by its inability to actively engage in 
concrete social issues, it appears to have led them to seek insight by reconsidering the 
Right’s critique and its possible political value, particularly Schmitt’s critique of 
liberalism. Ultimately, Jacoby’s and Piccone’s essays express a concern over the 
problems occurring among the Left during the early-1980s, and address the need for a 
new theoretical orientation, which they would find in Schmitt’s concept of friend and 
enemy, his critique of liberalism, and universalism.           
After Jacoby’s and Piccone’s analysis of a weakened political Left in the Winter 
issue of 1980-1981, Telos turned its attention toward radical politics, the future of the 
                                                        
162 Russell Jacoby, “The Crisis on the Left,” Telos 46, no. 46 (Winter 1980-1981): 111-114. 
163 Ibid., 113. 
  59 
political Left, new social movements, the crises in Eastern Europe and Soviet society, and 
modernity vs. post-modernity. Jacoby and Piccone’s analysis of the failures of the 
political Left appeared to begin a trend in Telos. The journal would continue to publish 
essays by various scholars analyzing the failures among the political Left, gradually 
leading the political Left to find ways to defend and strengthen themselves, as well as 
direct attention away from themselves.  
In the Spring of 1981, Telos published an issue titled: “Poland and the Future of 
Socialism.” Included in this issue was a series of essays written about civil society in 
Poland. Andrew Arato contributed an essay in Telos: “Civil Society Against the State: 
Poland 1980-81.”164 Arato explains the difference between Western and Eastern Europe 
in regards to the state and civil society. The development of the bourgeoisie, the free-
market economy, and the developing bureaucracies contribute to this separation of the 
state from society. In contrast, Eastern Europe represents a state that has dominant 
control over society. Arato, however, believes that the subordination of civil society to 
the state leads to authoritarian state socialism, which now exists in Poland, rather than 
true socialism. His support for reform socialist programs shows the themes emerging in 
Telos during the 1980s that related to the crises in Eastern Europe.  
Telos continued to publish essays that provided a unique perspective on the crises 
in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. In the Winter issue of 1980-1981 there appeared a 
“Special Symposium on the Role of Intellectuals in the 1980s,” to which Arato 
contributed another essay, “Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981-1982.” He analyzed 
the creation of the Polish democratic movement as well as the Polish Solidarity 
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Movement against the communist government. He described how an independent self-
governing workers union (Solidarity) continued to develop in Poland, separate from the 
Communist party. Arato argued that Western Europe can learn from this Polish 
democratic movement. For example, Western Europe must eventually break its trade with 
the Soviet Union, a trade that Arato believed subsidizes the Soviet Union’s economic 
power.  
With the electoral success of French Socialism in 1981, Telos published an issue 
in the spring of 1983 “A Special issue on French Socialism,” describing the negative 
effects that were occurring within the French socialist party. Gérard Raulet, a French 
philosopher, as well as a specialist on Herbert Marcuse, contributed an essay to the issue 
titled: “The Agony of Marxism and the Victory of the Left.”165 Raulet expresses a change 
in attitude toward resocialization with a socialist government. For this change to occur, 
modern socialism must develop into the new post-modern era for it to remain modern. 
Raulet argues that the rise in technology produces a capitalist crisis among the economic 
classes, indicating that the political Left must study the problems in post-modernity to 
understand the missed opportunities that occurred in modernity, to recreate the dialectic 
of modernity.  
   In the following Telos issue in the Summer of 1984 an unknown scholar, 
Federico Stame contributed an essay, “The Crisis of The Left and New Social 
Identities,”166 that addressed the problems that had occurred among Leftist ideologies and 
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political parties in the twentieth century.167 Stame describes the rise of an authoritarian 
state in capitalist societies, which had contributed to a weakened Left. Communism was 
thought to end the inequalities in society; however, the answer really lies in the 
significance of the labor movement as well as the development of state intervention. 
Stame considers the Left “banal.” He believes that the banality on the political Left is 
with totalizing politics – the concept of friend and foe. Stame uses the French Revolution 
and the Jacobins as an example of political struggles that produced the idea of friend and 
foe, which is also characterized in Schmitt’s concept of politics. Stame concludes by 
suggesting that the problem with the Left is that of formulating a new social contract, of 
liberty and security,168 eventually leading to the reformulation of the welfare state. For 
Stame, the Left needs to formulate a new social contract that accommodates the principal 
of liberty and security.169  
In the Summer issue of 1985, Telos published an essay by French social 
philosopher, André Gorz: “The American Model and the Future of the Left.”170 Gorz 
describes the expansion of capitalism in the U.S and how it affected the working class as 
well as the political Left. Gorz believes that to reconstruct the political Left, society must 
share the work available among the working class. It would allow for a society to operate 
as a whole outside salaried working time in a local community, to help reduce 
unemployment. Gorz appears to be supporting the notion of a socialist society, as part of 
the overall theme in Telos during the 1980s. 
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At the end of 1986, Telos had published essays on the topics of Western Marxism 
as an alternative to Soviet Communism, the development of Socialism in France, and 
how social theories derived from the Frankfurt School were relevant to the modern era. 
While some of these essays were indirectly related to Schmitt, with topics concerning the 
value of universalism, as well the concept of friend and enemy, few of them explicitly 
mentioned Schmitt during this time. The broader themes, however, that defined Telos 
between 1980 and 1986, seemed to suggest that Schmitt’s concepts of political theory 
could be valuable to what many essays in Telos described as a weakened Left. Schmitt 
had arrived at a propitious moment in Telos. Leftist scholars involved with Telos would 
begin to see valuable insight in Schmitt’s ideas. 
Beginning in 1987, Telos would publish essays about Schmitt in relation to the 
Frankfurt School and eventually other topics. These essays would show how critical 
Telos had become of the political Left, and how they reevaluated theoretical ideas of the 
twentieth century. This reevaluation would begin with Schmitt, eventually producing 
numerous essays concerning how valuable his insights were to the Left. Overall, 
Schmitt’s introduction into Telos would mark a considerable change for the journal, 
shifting their political perspective toward a more conservative approach. Ultimately, his 
presence in Telos would significantly change their leftist values as the post-modern era 
approached.  
 
Carl Schmitt’s Introduction into Telos 
In the Spring issue of 1987, Telos devoted an issue to Carl Schmitt. Ellen 
Kennedy, Professor of political theory at the University of Pennsylvania, wrote an essay, 
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in which she argues that there was a connection between Schmitt and the Frankfurt 
School. Kennedy argues that Schmitt influenced Frankfurt School figures before 1931 
(the year Horkheimer became the Director of the Institute for Social Research). Her essay 
elicited a response from three other scholars, and may also have attracted the attention of 
other authors who would write about Schmitt in Telos during the 1990s and post-2000. 
In her essay, Kennedy argues that a connection exists between Schmitt and Jürgen 
Habermas, Walter Benjamin, and Otto Kirchheimer. Kennedy argues that Schmitt’s 
impact on Habermas, Benjamin, and Kirchheimer shows how much he influenced the 
political Left and the Frankfurt School. Martin Jay, Ulrich Preuss, and Alfons Söllner, 
however, disagreed with Kennedy’s interpretation of Schmitt. Each of them wrote a 
response to Kennedy in the very same issue, addressing how inaccurate it was to claim 
that Schmitt influenced certain Frankfurt School figures. Their debate about Schmitt was 
the beginning of other scholars assessing Schmitt’s value in Telos.  
What came as a particular surprise was not that Kennedy introduced Schmitt to 
Telos, or that Martin Jay, Ulrich Preuss, and Alfons Sollner replied to Kennedy’s essay 
by criticizing Schmitt, but rather that the subject of Carl Schmitt continued to find 
attention with Telos beyond 1987. After the publication of the essays about how Schmitt 
influenced Frankfurt School figures, Telos became more concerned with Schmitt in 
regards to international law. When Telos author G.L. Ulmen wrote about Schmitt in the 
Summer issue of 1987: “Return of the Foe,”171 and “American Imperialism and 
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International Law: Carl Schmitt on the U.S. in World Affairs,”172 Schmitt was beginning 
to make his impact in the U.S. in the field of international relations.  
Some scholars would write essays defending Schmitt’s critique of political 
liberalism because of their belief that he would reinvigorate the political Left. Yet other 
scholars believed that Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis and his ideas regarding 
friend and enemy clearly demonstrated the danger of his ideas. Regardless, he was 
becoming a popular figure among the Leftist journal. The following examination of 
essays published in the journal after 1987 will show which themes emerged after 
Schmitt’s introduction to Telos and how his introduction influenced the direction of the 
journal.   
Why Schmitt, why now?173 These questions address the enigmatic connection 
between Telos and Schmitt that ultimately reveals why Telos took an interest in someone 
strongly opposed to leftist values. While some authors affiliated with Telos defended 
Schmitt’s critique of political liberalism, there were others who considered his concept of 
politics dangerous and, therefore, useless. The many Leftist scholars who valued 
Schmitt’s political ideas may well indicate that the political Left was desperate for 
answers. There is a need to understand the importance of the essays in Telos that describe 
the position of part of the political Left during the late-1980s, particularly by Paul 
Piccone and Russell Jacoby. They provide insights into what led Telos to consider a 
conservative revolutionary political theorist, Carl Schmitt, as a solution to the crises on 
the political Left.     
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Schmitt’s Reception in Telos: Post-1987 
 Analyzing what some scholars wrote in Telos about Schmitt after 1987 will help 
us understand why Telos was interested in Schmitt’s ideas, specifically with his critique 
of political liberalism. In 1987, G.L. Ulmen and Piccone wrote, “Introduction to Carl 
Schmitt,”174 as part of an entire Telos issue devoted to Schmitt; they addressed the logical 
question of what a conservative political theorist was doing in Telos. Ulmen and Piccone 
argued that Schmitt, as an advocate of super-legality and a critic of pseudo-universality, 
provided perspectives on a number of leftist issues. For instance, Schmitt’s critique of 
pseudo-universality was something the political Left, according to Piccone and Ulmen, 
can learn lessons from when it concerns itself with the pursuit of egalitarianism as the 
super-legal form of politics.175 Piccone and Ulmen argued that the political Left during 
the late 1980s was consumed with formal and abstract equality, which has only produced 
inequality. Piccone and Ulmen address this inequality in their essay by stating, “The 
super-legal imperative of equality-no-matter-what succeeds in blinding leftist theory to 
new social conflicts which, to the extent that they remain unproblematized, can only 
remain unsolved, worse yet, become intensified.”176 Schmitt’s theory was becoming 
valuable to the political Left, according to them, because of their inability to recognize 
the enemy, rather treating the enemy as an equal. Piccone and Ulmen understand that the 
political Left does not consider Schmitt’s answers relevant, but they urged it to consider 
how important his questions are concerning the power struggle between political 
opponents and the effort to promote equality.  
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 In the Winter issue of 1987-1988, Jeffrey Herf, an intellectual historian at the 
University of Maryland, wrote an essay on the danger of Schmitt to the political Left: 
“Reading and Misreading Schmitt.”177 The essay is addressed to the editors of Telos, 
criticizing their issues devoted to Schmitt. Herf argues that the danger in Schmitt lies in 
Schmitt’s belief that authoritarianism was a solution to the Weimar Republic.178 Herf 
questions why Schmitt has received a warm welcome in Telos when he was involved 
with the Nazis. He asks, what is so important about Schmitt that he should come before 
Churchill, Alexander Hamilton, or any other less scrutinized conservative? Also part of 
the essay was Piccone and Ulmen’s response to Herf’s criticism. They argued that his 
reaction against Telos was motivated by Joseph Bendersky’s recent critical review of 
Herf’s book Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar the 
Third Reich.179 Herf’s book describes Schmitt’s involvement with the National Socialist 
Party. Piccone and Ulmen argue that Telos does not buy into the nonsense that Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis was driven by his desire to join them.180 Rather, for the 
political Left, specifically Telos, to read and understand Schmitt shows an open mind. His 
critique of liberalism can reform liberal institutions from their “mechanistic” and 
“neoconservative” ways. This essay was the beginning of many essays published in Telos 
that enshrined Ulmen’s, and especially Piccone’s political opinion of Schmitt in Telos. As 
the 1990s approached, Telos would publish other essays that either criticized or defended 
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Schmitt, indicating that if anything was certain in Telos, it was that it continued to change 
its political perspective on Schmitt. 
 After the publication of Herf’s essay, Telos would not publish another essay on 
Schmitt until 1990. During Schmitt’s brief absence, Telos turned its attention toward 
Perestroika, the movement for economic reform within the Soviet Communist party. 
Other themes involved the inequality of capitalism; there was also an issue devoted to the 
twenty-year anniversary of Telos; an issue concerning communitarianism; a special issue 
devoted to Max Weber; and an issue concerning the crisis of Communism in China and 
Poland.  
In the Spring issue of 1990, Schmitt reappeared in Telos with Piccone and 
Ulmen’s essay: “Schmitt’s ‘Testament’ and the Future of Europe.”181 The essay addresses 
Schmitt’s concept of European jurisprudence as it related to postmodern Europe and the 
U.S. Piccone and Ulmen show how Schmitt argued that there should be a balance 
between super power countries, if countries can be self-limited and homogenous with one 
another. Piccone and Ulmen believe that Schmitt offers some perspective into European 
jurisprudence, as an alternative to pseudo-universalism, or human rights.182 As the 1990s 
continued, Telos focused its attention on the crises of the Soviet Union and the New 
Soviet Left, devoting in an entire issue on the future of the Soviet Left.  
In the Spring issue of 1991, Piccone wrote an essay: “The Crisis of Liberalism 
and the Emergence of Federal Populism.”183 Federal populism emerged as a broader 
theme in Telos during the 1990s, and it related to Schmitt’s work on the homogeneity of a 
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state. Although Telos published other essays on federal populism during the 1990s, 
Piccone’s introductory essay in this issue represents a new direction for the journal. It 
became more concerned with federal populism and how it related to Schmitt’s concept of 
state sovereignty. Piccone describes in his essay the crises of a liberal democracy after 
the fall of communism, mentioning the crisis of “ungovernability.” Populism demands 
government accountability. According to Piccone, this accountability failed with the 
welfare state because it ends up “…relegitimating existing relations of domination, 
privilege and socio-economic inequality by redimensioning the role of the central 
government.”184 Piccone presents the positive effects of Lombard League’s new 
populism, which developed in Italy, based on a federal populism outside of bureaucratic 
inefficiency.185 It calls for the break-up of Italy into three more viable sub-units.186 To 
achieve territorial control through smaller entities, the Lombard League’s new populism 
presents a new democratic spirit beyond a declining liberalism. The Lombard League is 
an example of redefining territorial control, something that Piccone argues is possible in 
the U.S and in Europe, rather than defining territorial terms through ethnic, racial, racial, 
linguistic, or other terms.       
In the Spring issue of 1992 “Special Issue on Federalism,” Schmitt was part of an 
essay by Ulmen titled: “Schmitt and Federalism: Introduction to the Constitutional 
Theory of the Federation.”187 In his essay, Ulmen describes Schmitt’s interpretation of 
federalism in the Weimar Constitution. Especially important for Ulmen is Schmitt’s 
analysis of federalism as a historical perspective as seen with the League of Nations, 
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which was an attempt for nation-states to conform to universal norms. States that did not 
comply with this universalism, according to Schmitt, would become a hindrance to peace. 
Ulmen notes how Schmitt presents the problems in a federation; for example, the 
homogeneity of every nation-state is different, which leads to different ideas on forming a 
federal constitution. Ulmen’s essay is an example of the new tendency of Telos to publish 
fewer essays on Western Marxism and the Frankfurt School because it was becoming 
more intrigued with what Schmitt had to offer in regards to territorial control. 
 Also included in the spring issue of 1992 was an essay by American political 
scientist, George Schwab: “Carl Schmitt Hysteria in the U.S: The Case of Bill 
Scheuerman.”188 Schwab analyzes William Scheuerman’s attack on “young Schmittians,” 
a term used to describe young scholars interested in reviving Schmitt during the 1990s. 
Schwab describes in his essay how Scheuerman attacks his book The Challenge of the 
Exception.189 Schwab shows how Scheuerman attacks his view of Schmitt, specifically 
how Schwab underemphasizes Schmitt’s role with the Nazis. Scheuerman believes that 
Schmitt played a far greater role with the Nazis, such as sending Jews to concentration 
camps. Schwab describes Scheuerman’s position and others scholars who criticize 
Schmitt as “crude Schmittians.” Other scholars would also write about Schmitt’s role 
with the Nazis in Telos as part of a consistent theme in the journal during the 1990s, 
further indicating a divide among the political Left over the value of Schmitt.  
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Italian jurist, political scientist, Gianfranco Miglio wrote an essay, “Beyond 
Schmitt,”190 for Telos in the Summer issue of 1994 on “Federalism.”  In Miglio’s essay, 
he argues, similar to Schmitt, that politics and the modern state, centered on Christian 
theology, are joined together. The state was developed to “normalize” politics, toward 
“self-neutralization.”191 According to Miglio, however, new conflicts developed inside 
and outside the state. The state becomes useless when it can no longer resolve every 
conflict. The state becomes a manifestation of politics, rather than the state and politics 
acting in cohesion. According to Miglio, Schmitt cannot accept this separation between 
politics and the state. As a result, Miglio believes political science must look beyond 
Schmitt to deal with “politics beyond the state.”192 Miglio was another example of how 
many scholars were critical of Schmitt, be it for his concept of political theory or for his 
involvement with the National Socialist Party.   
A response to Miglio’s essay appeared in the Summer Telos issue of 1994: 
Ulmen’s essay, “Beyond Schmitt? A Reply to Miglio.”193 Ulmen addresses Miglio’s 
criticism of Schmitt by arguing that, while Miglio believes that the political is enmity 
itself, Schmitt views the political is the distinction between friend and enemy. Ulmen also 
shows that Miglio believes that the state and the political are separate, which is beyond 
Schmitt. But Ulmen argues that Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy was a way of 
defining the political and who is sovereign. Overall, Ulmen argues that Miglio fails to 
recognize Schmitt’s influence in political theory, his idea of the modern state, his concept 
of nomos, and his concept of the political.  
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As Schmitt’s Anglo-American reception widened during the 1990s, a common 
theme that kept reappearing in Telos was how Schmitt was considered valuable for his 
critique of universal law. In the Winter Telos issue of 1995, leftist scholars continued to 
write about Schmitt’s critique of liberalism as well as his critique of universalism. One of 
the essays to appear in this issue was by Julien Freund, the French philosopher and 
sociologist: “Schmitt’s Political Thought.”194 Freund’s overall purpose for his essay is to 
explore Schmitt’s political vision as a jurist.195 Similar to Miglio’s essay, Freund 
addresses Schmitt’s concept of the state as part of political unity. The state is the 
political, having the ability to intervene when politics is challenged by religion or 
economics.196 Furthermore, Freund presents Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy and 
the sovereignty of the state that coincides with political unity. As Freund elaborates the 
extent of Schmitt’s political thought, he argues that Schmitt’s life is full of contrasts; he 
goes against the current ways of thinking among the political Left. Despite these 
contradictions, according to Freund, Schmitt provides quality writing that cannot be 
ignored. 
 Another essay included in the Winter Telos issue of 1995 was by a Roman 
Catholic Theologian, Wolfgang Palaver: “Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism.” His essay 
analyzes Schmitt’s perspective on liberalism, particularly how Schmitt was an advocate 
of sacrificial Christianity, which Palaver believes is completely different from liberalism, 
in that man pursues his own goals and rejects sacrifice.197 Palaver argues that Schmitt is a 
communitarian critic of liberalism because of his idea of sacrifice, which derived from 
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the National Socialist Party. For this reason Palaver believes that Schmitt should be 
disregarded. Palaver argues that Schmitt’s concept of sacrificial Christianity lacks 
universal love, suggesting that Schmitt should not be the model for communitarian 
critiques of liberalism. 
 Although Schmitt’s concept of the state and liberalism was a reoccurring theme in 
Telos, the concern over his idea of Nomos of the earth was also receiving attention. This 
theme was part of another essay that Palaver wrote in the Winter issue of 1996: “Carl 
Schmitt on Nomos and Space.”198 Palaver focuses on the religious dimensions of 
Schmitt’s ideas on international relations. Focusing on Schmitt’s religious influences, 
Palaver believes, could lead to some new interpretations of Schmitt’s thought, 
particularly his critique of universalism and the rejection of a unified world.199 Palaver 
claims that Schmitt’s concept of Nomos was a form of religious order, developed from 
Catholicism, which Palaver sees in Schmitt’s post-World War II writing and lectures. 
Although Palaver agrees with Schmitt’s religious interpretation of the spatial world order, 
he disagrees with Schmitt regarding universalism. Schmitt viewed universalism as an 
impossible solution because there had always been enmity between nations. In contrast to 
Schmitt’s opposition to universal world-order, Palaver believes that universalism is part 
of Catholicism, which would create a homogenous world, a necessary step beyond 
Schmitt.        
Palaver’s essay about Schmitt’s concept of Nomos and space elicited a response 
from Ulmen, that was published in that same issue. Ulmen argues that Palaver’s analysis 
of Schmitt’s concept of Nomos is “absurd,” because Palaver argues that Schmitt’s idea of 
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Nomos and space is defined by religion. For Ulmen, Schmitt’s concept of Nomos and 
space was not designed for a religious purpose, but rather to understand global territory 
as well as the distinction between friend and enemy.200 Palaver presents Schmitt’s 
rejection of universalism as a means to discredit Schmitt’s interpretation of Nomos and 
space and, therefore, to look beyond his concept of international politics. Although 
Ulmen disagrees with some of Palaver’s religious perspectives on Schmitt, he agrees that 
we should look to Schmitt in order to strengthen a weakened Left. These two essays are 
an example of why Schmitt remained important for Telos throughout the 1990s to post-
2000.  
In the Fall issue of 1996, Telos devoted a special issue to Schmitt’s impact on 
Telos: “Carl Schmitt Now.” It addressed how the interpretation of Schmitt’s thought had 
changed from when he had first appeared in Telos in 1987. The first essay to appear in 
this issue was by Ulmen: “Toward a New World Order; Introduction to Carl Schmitt’s, 
The Land Appropriation of a New World.”201 Ulmen provides a short analysis of 
Schmitt’s book Nomos of the Earth, specifically chapter two, which was titled “The Land 
Appropriation of a New World.” In a comparison to Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth, 
Ulmen shows how other contemporary intellectuals, such as Francis Fukuyama and 
Samuel Huntington, developed theories of spatial order from Wilsonianism. Ulmen 
believes that these two intellectuals held flawed views concerning global conflict and 
how to resolve it. Towards the end of his essay, Ulmen addresses Schmitt’s value after 
the fall of Communism during the 1980s and specifically how it related to developing 
larger spatial entities and creating a new Nomos.  
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As part of the special Fall issue of 1996 concerning Schmitt’s impact on Telos, 
German legal philosopher, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde contributed an essay titled: 
“Carl Schmitt Revisited.”202 Böckenförde discusses Schmitt’s rising popularity in the 
U.S. and the burgeoning literature written about him, signifying how Schmitt is more 
relevant than ever during the mid-1990s. Leftist scholars continued to write about 
Schmitt’s theory of the state, his role in National Socialism, and his role as a political 
theologian, which Böckenförde believes is key to understanding Schmitt.203 Böckenförde 
argues that it will reveal if Schmitt is a genuine Catholic or if his Catholicism was a way 
of protecting himself from his past mistakes. 
Ulmen reappeared in the Fall of the 1996 Telos issue with another essay, “Just 
Friends or Just Enemies,”204 about Schmitt’s work on international law. Ulmen explains 
how the twentieth century is characterized by a lack of bracketing war; there is a need for 
a new Nomos of the earth. He believes that Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy is 
relevant during the 1990s because it relates to just and unjust wars that have occurred 
during the twentieth century. Ulmen specifically addresses Schmitt’s 1945 book 
Gutachten, in which Schmitt explains “War Crimes,” “The Legal Situation Between 
Ordinary Citizens during War,” as well as his friend and enemy distinction. Ulmen 
attempts to show the relevance of Schmitt during the 1990s, especially how nations group 
themselves as friends and enemies.205 Ulmen believes that “…the dissolution of old 
orders and the desire for new types of political collectivities has raised again the central 
                                                        
202 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Carl Schmitt Revisited,” Telos 109, no. 109: 81-86. 
203 Ibid., 86. 
204 Gary Ulmen, “Just Friends or Just Enemies,” Telos 109, no. 109 (Fall 1996): 99-113. 
205 Ibid., 110. 
  75 
question of international law – the concept of war.”206 Overall, Ulmen perceived Schmitt 
as offering insight into the future of international law toward universalism and peace by 
creating a new nomos of the earth. 
 Joseph Bendersky’s essay, “Schmitt and Hobbes,”207 appeared in Telos as the 
final essay on Schmitt in the Fall issue of 1996. The essay was a review of Schwab’s 
translation of Schmitt’s book, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: 
Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol.208 In this review, Bendersky also addresses 
Schmitt’s similarity to Thomas Hobbes. According to Bendersky, Schwab’s English 
translation of Schmitt’s Leviathan during the 1990s provides a more definitive 
understanding of Schmitt’s political concept of the state. He also argues, however, that 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes does not fully define Schmitt’s work as a political 
theorist. One of the reasons for this claim is because Bendersky shows how Schwab’s 
translation of Schmitt’s Leviathan indicates Schmitt was “free of Nazi jargon.”209 Unlike 
Schwab, Bendersky believes that Schmitt’s Leviathan is still confusing because when he 
wrote it, it was unclear if he was loyal to the Nazis or if he was paying homage to Jewish 
scholars. For this reason, Bendersky argues that an interpretation of Schmitt’s life in 
relation to the Leviathan is difficult because of how one should perceive him after his 
involvement with the Nazis. 
   In the Summer issue of 1998, Schmitt made another appearance in Telos. 
Professor of Political Science at UC Santa Cruz, Andrew Norris, wrote an essay, “Carl 
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Schmitt on Friends, Enemies, and the Political,”210 devoted to interpreting some of 
Schmitt’s political ideas. Norris explains Schmitt’s concept of friend and enemy as a 
political decision, of the ruler and ruled. Schmitt perceived politics in regards to a defense 
against the enemy, a physical battle, in which the ruler could supersede the law for war. 
For Norris, however, too many critics perceive Schmitt as “war mongering.”211 Schmitt 
understood the political through a democracy which required homogeneity, was 
committed to an authority, and must be prepared to fight to the death against the enemy. 
Norris concludes by arguing that Schmitt’s concept of the political offers insight into 
individual commitment to a community. Norris states: “For it is simply not true that 
every Nazi or Stalinist was an evil, stupid, or morally retarded human being. As 
disturbing as it sounds, it follows from this that there were what appeared to be good 
reasons to believe that legitimate needs could be met by such movements.”212 By looking 
beyond Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis as well as the Nazis themselves, Norris 
ultimately believes that Schmitt’s concept of the political can provide insight into the 
shortcomings of political liberalism, and the importance of political unity.  
From the start of the 1987 Telos issue, to Schmitt establishing his mark in Telos 
through the end of the 1990s, his political ideas were becoming more popular among the 
political Left. One of the common themes to reappear in the essays on Schmitt during the 
1990s was his past involvement with the Nazis, and particularly, how it affected the value 
of his writings after he left the Nazi party. While many scholars were willing to overlook 
Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis, was not downplayed by some on the political Left. 
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Piccone, Ulmen, Bendersky, and others who were willing to look beyond Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis, believed that Schmitt’s idea of territorial control through 
smaller entities was an alternative to universal world order.  
In the Spring issue of 2001, Ulmen wrote an essay titled: “Between the Weimar 
Republic and the Third Reich: Continuity in Carl Schmitt’s Thought.”213 This essay 
continues the theme from essays in the 1990s by addressing previous discussions of 
whether or not there was a break in Schmitt’s political thought after he joined the Nazi 
Party, or if he was tainted from the start of his political career.214 Ulmen demonstrates 
sympathy for Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazi Party by arguing that Schmitt was left 
with no choice but to join the Nazi party with the collapse of the German state and the 
Weimar constitution. According to him, there was also no trace of anti-Semitism in 
Schmitt’s writing prior to 1933. Ulmen concludes by arguing that Schmitt’s 
understanding of Thomas Hobbes was predicated on an “authoritarian form of bourgeois 
liberalism.”215 Although aware of Schmitt’s terrible compromises with the Nazi party, 
Ulmen believes that Schmitt did not lose his mind during the Third Reich, but rather 
continued to study constitutional law and international law. It presents continuity in 
Schmitt’s thought that was not disrupted by his involvement with the Third Reich. 
Another essay published on Schmitt in the spring issue of 2001 addressed the 
relationship between the French philosopher, Michel Foucault and Schmitt. Written by 
Mika Ojakangas, a Finnish political theorist and philosopher, “Sovereign and Plebs: 
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Michel Foucault Meets Carl Schmitt”216 argues that an affinity exists between Foucault 
and Schmitt in regards to the sovereignty of the state and the plebs. Foucault sees the 
plebs as a source of political resistance, as outside the normal legal order. In a similar 
way, Schmitt described the sovereignty of the state as outside the legal order. Ojakangas 
also recognizes the differences between Foucault and Schmitt over “how” and “who” is 
sovereign, but shows their similarity in their opposition to “concrete life and universal 
domination.”217 While this particular essay does not relate to the previous essays that 
Telos published on Schmitt, it shows how some on the political Left perceived Schmitt 
and how important he remained to Telos. 
In the Winter issue of 2002, Piccone and Ulmen wrote an essay titled, “Uses and 
Abuses of Carl Schmitt.”218 Piccone and Ulmen explain that when Telos was initially 
gaining interest in Schmitt, it was because of the collapse of the political Left and 
Norberto Bobbio’s criticism of how the political Left and Marxism had no political 
theory.219 Nearly two decades later, Piccone and Ulmen discuss Schmitt’s reception 
through different scholars, who were hostile to Schmitt because of how he had been part 
of the Nazi regime. Piccone and Ulmen conclude by attempting to show that Schmitt was 
no authoritarian or fascist, but rather one who has insight from his Weimar and post-
World War II work.   
Also included in the Winter Telos issue was Bendersky’s essay: “The Definite and 
the Dubious: Carl Schmitt’s Influence on Conservative Political and Legal Theory in the 
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U.S.”220 Bendersky contributes to the continuing theme of Schmitt’s involvement with 
the Nazis. He describes how some scholars label Schmitt a “Weimar Fascist.” Bendersky, 
however, believes that Schmitt should be labeled a “statist,” because his aim was for 
order and stability.221 Through most of his essay, Bendersky argues that Schmitt’s 
influence on American conservatism through Schumpeter, Hayek, Morgenthau, etc., has 
been based on a “hidden dialogue,” which was based on a close reading of Schmitt’s 
writings. Bendersky disagrees with this notion of a “hidden dialogue” that influenced 
American conservatism because of other intellectual influences that have to be taken into 
account. Yet these influences are not named in his essay. Moreover, while Schmitt has 
influenced American conservatism, Bendersky argues that “Schmitt’s ghost” – a fascist 
influence on American conservatism – is not seen in conservative intellectuals during the 
twentieth century. Bendersky overall argues that Schmitt’s influence on Schumpeter, 
Hayek, and Morgenthau was from his Weimar writings, suggesting that Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis should be overlooked.  
Luis María Bandieri, also wrote an essay for the 2002 Winter issue titled “Carl 
Schmitt and Federalism,”222 which addresses Schmitt’s idea of federalism.223 Bandieri 
describes Schmitt’s writings on federalism in terms of how they related to the 
homogeneity of its members and when the sovereignty of the state acts in an exceptional 
situation. According to Bandieri, Schmitt perceived the unity of the state as necessary for 
global juridical order because the state secures its own internal peace. But with the 
decline of state sovereignty at the end of the twentieth century, Bandieri argues that 
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global sovereignty is needed, especially since the September 11th attacks. In regards to 
terrorism Schmitt can provide insight into global safety. Federalism was part of an overall 
theme in which Telos continued to take an interest, indicating why Schmitt kept 
reappearing in some of the essays in Telos.    
In the Fall 2002 issue, Ulmen wrote an essay titled: “Carl Schmitt and Donoso 
Cortés.”224 Also published in that issue were three of Schmitt’s essays on Donoso Cortés, 
offering additional information on Schmitt’s perspective of Cortés. In his essay, Ulmen 
addresses how Cortés is relevant to the “global civil war.”225 With the September 11, 
2001 attacks, a global civil war has erupted. Since these attacks, according to Ulmen, 
sovereign governments are still bound by certain constraints, unable to defeat the 
international foe. Ulmen believes that Cortés’ influence on Schmitt’s concept of 
sovereignty and international law makes Cortés especially relevant in an age of global 
civil war.  
Many leftist scholars after 2002 continued to write essays in Telos on Schmitt’s 
concept of international law and state sovereignty. Although many scholars disagreed 
with Schmitt’s concepts of friend and foe or state sovereignty, others believed that 
Schmitt’s concept of a new Nomos provided an alternative to universalism, especially 
with the emergence of universal protection after the terrorist attacks in 2001. 
 
Conclusion 
Schmitt’s introduction into Telos was an indication of a weakened political Left, 
critical of itself after the collapse of the New Left in the 1970s and the decline of Soviet 
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Communism in the 1980s. Telos defended Western Marxism as the alternative to Soviet 
Communism from 1968 to the mid-1980s. After the defeats of the political Left in the 
early-1980s, however, many leftist scholars felt that a way to reinvigorate the political 
Left in Europe and the U.S. was to explore new ideas. This eventually led them to 
examine Schmitt’s critique of liberalism as well as state sovereignty. Some leftist 
scholars involved with Telos argued that Schmitt had been unjustly overlooked in the 
past, believing his critiques of liberalism and universalism were a way to reorient the 
political Left. The appeal of his political ideas shows that the Telos group was desperate 
for new theoretical perspectives beyond Western Marxism. As a way for Telos to look 
beyond the perceived shortcomings of Western Marxism, Schmitt’s challenging questions 
provided Telos with the opportunity to reorient themselves, particularly with a critical 
focus on liberalism and universalism. The essays published by Telos throughout the 
1970s and early 1980s, signify how important Western Marxism had been to the journal. 
However, when all forms of Marxism, even the Western Marxist tradition that had been 
defined largely in opposition to Soviet Communism, were weakened by the decline and 
eventual collapse of the Soviet Union during the early-1980s, Telos reexamined their 
principles. Part of this reexamination was introducing Schmitt’s political work into the 
leftist journal, to determine if his work held relative value among the political left. As 
many of the essays in Telos during the late-1980s and throughout the 1990s suggest, 
Schmitt’s work helped spur a new discussion among the Left. For Piccone and many 
scholars who wrote about Schmitt during that time, Schmitt was popular because of the 
rise of a new aggressive liberal universalism in the 1990s and, again, after the attacks on 
the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. Yet Schmitt did not appear only in 
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Telos. His presence in the journal is a reminder of how popular Schmitt became during 
this time rather than the solutions that were found among the Left. 
 
Chapter III 
Schmitt’s Reception among the American Left: 1981-2003 
 In addition to Schmitt’s reception in Telos, his work on political theory continued 
to attract scholarly attention beyond the leftist journal. This chapter explains why Anglo-
American political theorists outside of Telos found Schmitt relevant or irrelevant. This 
chapter’s aim is to discuss the main camps that drew from Schmitt, if they were critical of 
Schmitt or attempted to show the value of his ideas. One of the themes that continued to 
reappear in political theory, which will be discussed in this chapter, is why the political 
Left drew on Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism and universalism as well as why there were 
still some on the political Left who continued to criticize Schmitt. There were those on 
the political Left, such as John McCormick, who defamed Schmitt’s reputation because 
of his affiliation with the National Socialist Party. But others on the Left, such as Chantel 
Mouffe, found Schmitt relevant for his critique of liberal universalism. The first section 
of this chapter is an explanation of why certain leftist scholars opposed Schmitt. The 
second section of this chapter identifies why these specific leftist theorists found Schmitt 
relevant beyond his collaboration with the National Socialist Party. While some theorists 
emphasized the political reasons why Schmitt should be criticized, and others stressed his 
value as a political theorist, there were others who thought Schmitt was dangerous as well 
as valuable. The overall intent of this chapter is to understand some of the different ways 
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in which various leftist scholars have interpreted Schmitt’s political thought and how they 
shaped Schmitt’s American reception at the end of the twentieth century. 
 
The Leftist Critique of Schmitt 
 Before Schmitt began to appear in Telos in 1987, the American political theorist, 
George Schwab introduced Schmitt’s political concepts in his book, The Challenge of the 
Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt Between 1921 and 
1936.226 Originally published in 1970, with the second edition published in 1989, Schwab 
notes in an essay he wrote about Schmitt – later republished by Telos – that his work on 
Schmitt opened the debate on how relevant Schmitt’s political thought was to the 
political Left. Schwab’s work on Schmitt shows how Schmitt’s ideas developed between 
1921 and 1933, and which parts of Schmitt’s writings from 1933 to 1936 reflected Nazi 
ideology.227 It is important to note that, since Schwab had to interpret Schmitt’s German 
writings, because they had not yet been translated in English, he was one of the first 
American political theorists to explicitly introduce Schmitt’s ideas into the U.S. Schwab 
explains that his work serves as an introduction to Schmitt’s main ideas between 1921 
and 1936.228  
Schwab begins his study of Schmitt by explaining how Schmitt’s concept of the 
state was based on the Weimar Constitution. Closely studying Schmitt’s interpretation of 
Article 48, Schwab explains that Schmitt argued for a dictatorship that could supersede 
the law in circumstances that called for a state of exception. Schmitt was critical of 
                                                        
226 George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt 
Between 1921 and 1936 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1982), 175.  
227 Ibid., 7.  
228 Ibid., 8.  
  84 
Article 48 because it limited the power of the dictator under the Weimar Constitution. 
Schwab describes Schmitt’s concept of dictatorship as a latitudinarian interpretation 
because it allowed the dictatorship to take control of the state when the state could no 
longer protect the people. Part of Schwab’s main argument emerges near the end of his 
first chapter, where he argues that Schmitt’s interpretation of the state of exception as 
well as the meaning of dictatorship does not disprove the claim that his writings 
undermined the Weimar Constitution or paved the way for Hitler.229 On the contrary, 
Schmitt’s writing on the meaning of dictatorship in no way opposed the rise of Nazism, 
according to Schwab.   
      Schwab also offers an explanation of Schmitt’s interpretation of dictatorship, 
sovereignty, democracy, and political liberalism. Schwab tries to demonstrate why 
Schmitt’s interpretation of the Weimar Constitution makes clear that he condoned the 
events leading to the National Socialist seizure of power. In chapter three Schwab 
explains why Schmitt advocated for presidential powers. Schmitt deplored a 
parliamentary system of government, which he identified with liberalism. The essence of 
liberalism, according to Schmitt, was public debate, the separation of powers, and the 
enactment of laws through parliamentary discussion. Schmitt argued that this 
parliamentary system did not embody the decision of the people. For the people needed 
to make the decision on how to form their constitution. And this decision must take the 
form of a sovereign leader who acts for the people. Schwab ultimately argues that 
Schmitt desired to restore unity and order through presidential powers beyond a 
parliamentary system. When the National Socialists came to power in 1933, it was based 
on “equal chance” which, Schmitt explains, was the idea that the party in power cannot 
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deny any other party the chance to acquire power.230 Schwab shows that through legality 
and “equal chance,” the National Socialist Party was able to obtain political power. It was 
legality and “equal chance,” Schwab argues, that were embedded in Schmitt’s political 
theory.231     
In the second section of Schwab’s study, he discusses Schmitt’s involvement with 
the National Socialist Party. To further argue that Nazism corrupted Schmitt’s work, 
Schwab shows that Schmitt includes Nazi terminology in some of his writings after 
1935.232 Schwab specifically looks at three events that illuminate Schmitt’s role in the 
National Socialist Party: the Reichstag fire of February 27th, 1933; the election of March 
5th, 1933; and the Enabling Act of March 24th, 1933.233 Because of the Reichstag fire a 
presidential decree was promulgated which suspended individual liberty, which allowed 
Hitler to gain additional power. The March 5th election ushered in 288 National Socialist 
representatives, enough to pass – with the help of the German National People’s Party 
(DNVP) and the Catholic Center Party – an Enabling Act that put an end to the Weimar 
Republic and superseded the Weimar Constitution. Schmitt believed the Weimar 
Constitution was no longer valid because it no longer contained any substance. 
According to Schwab, Schmitt believed Hitler was a viable solution to Germany’s 
political problems.  
 Schwab is also concerned with why Schmitt’s polemics against Kelsen’s 
normativism during the 1920s continued after Hitler’s reign of power.234 Schwab argues 
that “Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction was based on his polemics against non-political 
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normativism.”235 For Schmitt, concrete-order, which expresses the will of the people, is 
not the basis of legitimacy, but is rather a part of it. Part of the problem that Schwab sees 
in Schmitt’s explanation of legitimacy, is that Schmitt believes legitimacy was created 
when the National Socialist Party acted in a state of emergency, through concrete-order 
and not interpretation; yet they would have hesitated to act in normal times. Schwab 
believes, however, that a totalitarian system would have had complete control of concrete 
order in the state of emergency as well as in normal times.  
 In his conclusion, Schwab argues that Schmitt’s answers to concrete legal 
questions demonstrate how and why Schmitt valued the state. With his concern for the 
political unity of the German state, he opted for a totalitarian system, because of the 
perceived failures of the Weimar Republic. Schwab believes that Schmitt was a firm 
advocate of Nazism because it was a way to preserve the German state after the fall of the 
Weimar Republic. Schmitt also advocated against the Weimar Constitution because he 
did not want any majority taking control of political decisions. It is important to 
recognize Schwab’s interpretation as one of the first works on Schmitt because other 
scholars during the 1990s would take a similar position to Schwab, in arguing that 
Schmitt’s involvement with the National Socialist Party defined Schmitt as a dangerous 
political theorist.  
 Twenty-five years after Schwab’s work, John McCormick published Carl 
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology.236 McCormick explains 
how Schmitt’s theory of technology affects his criticism of liberal parliamentarism. As 
part of his overall purpose, McCormick argues that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism 
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demonstrates the threat of neo-conservatism as well as neo-fascist authoritarianism. 
McCormick’s work on Schmitt is similar to Schwab, with both arguing that Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis highlights the danger of Schmitt’s political ideas.   
 McCormick argues that Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lukács, and especially Weber, 
held political positions similar to Schmitt’s critique of technology. For Schmitt believed 
that technology was not abstract, which was what Heidegger, Lukács, and Weber also 
held true. According to McCormick:  
Weber, Nietzsche, and Heidegger tend to view the concrete qualitative as either remnants of the 
pre-modern past or something that must be ‘willed’ into the modern present. As demonstrated, 
Schmitt is more sensitive to the particular dualism that makes up modernity and modern thought 
and their interrelatedness: objective/subjective, form/content, abstract/concrete.237 
 
McCormick argues that Schmitt’s confrontation with rationality and irrationality or 
technology/romanticism, led him to accept totalitarian politics as a way to transcend these 
two antimonies.238 Another way for Schmitt to transcend these two antimonies, 
McCormick argues, was through Catholicism. Catholicism was behind Schmitt’s vision 
of politics. He believed that Catholicism created a distinction between good and evil, 
whereas economics and technology obscured this distinction. McCormick argues that 
Schmitt saw the Antichrist in economics and technology. Therefore, the Antichrist is seen 
as something fearful, as a mythical character, which is why Schmitt attached it to 
economics and technology, as a way to conquer these things that obscure the distinction 
between good and evil. McCormick argues that Schmitt used the imagery of myth as an 
antidote against economics and technology – a myth that was ingrained in totalitarianism.   
McCormick also discusses Schmitt’s interpretation of political liberalism and how 
it was related to technology. McCormick argues that Schmitt’s political position in The 
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Dictatorship, which was published in 1921, changed when he wrote Political Theology in 
1922.239 Schmitt argues in The Dictatorship for a temporary dictatorship that attempts to 
restore constitutional order because it is worth preserving. Just a year later, when 
Political Theology was published, Schmitt argued for an unlimited sovereign leader who 
could restore a constitutional order that had grown torpid.240 McCormick explores the 
danger of Schmitt’s work in Political Theology. His belief in an unlimited sovereignty 
that acts in an emergency situation to overrule the constitution led him from conservatism 
to fascism, according to McCormick. In other words, in Political Theology Schmitt 
begins to fuse popular sovereignty and emergency provisions, which was quite different 
than a year earlier in The Dictatorship, in which Schmitt had been wary of revolutionary 
initiatives that fused popular sovereignty and emergency provisions.241 
McCormick also argues that Catholicism and political form were influential to 
Schmitt’s understanding of political theory. McCormick argues that Schmitt’s belief in 
medieval Catholicism as representative of a state, which advocates a sovereign leader, is 
no different than a parliamentary representation. Both representations create 
sociopolitical results for ‘publicity of display.’ But when Schmitt turns medieval 
Catholicism towards presidential power, he makes a nation ready for combat.242 Through 
Catholicism Schmitt aims for an authoritarian state as a way to undermine a 
parliamentary system of government.  
McCormick also shows that Schmitt believes technology has corrupted not only 
parliament and representation, but also the theory of the law. McCormick argues that 
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Schmitt favored a constitutional democracy as opposed to a liberal democracy. He was 
critical of abstract positivism in jurisprudence because, as McCormick states, “… it 
allows concrete political reality to elude theoretical analysis or because it acts as a 
normative obstruction to his designs for a new form of concrete domination adequate to 
the twentieth-century state/society relationship.”243 To do away with the abstractness of 
the law, Schmitt requires a concrete form of law, which he finds in state activity rather 
than individual liberty. McCormick argues that Schmitt aims to replace liberal principles 
with the element of fear.244   
Further on in his study, McCormick addresses Schmitt’s interpretation of the state 
at of the end of the 1920s. McCormick specifically shows why Schmitt was an advocate 
of Thomas Hobbes, and how Schmitt applied Hobbes’s interpretation of the nature of 
humanity to his political theory. For Schmitt believed that fear was embedded in the 
nature of humanity. McCormick explains, however, that fear, technology, and the state 
are not as easily distinguishable in Hobbes’s thought as Schmitt believed in The 
Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes.245 Moreover, Schmitt revived Hobbes’s 
notion of the state and the fear that embodies it because it gave clarity to understanding 
how politics is defined by friend and enemy. This fear, according to McCormick, is how 
the state controls the people living in the state, which leads to an authoritarian state.  
McCormick also addresses Strauss’s relationship to Schmitt and, in particular, 
how Strauss criticized Schmitt’s interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of the state. Strauss 
argues that the state demands the obedience of its citizens, to be governed because they 
cannot govern themselves, whereas Schmitt believes that the state demands a readiness to 
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die from the people of the state. Beyond their differences, Schmitt and Strauss believed 
that through the myth of fear the state could control its citizens. This fear, McCormick 
argues, was a way for Schmitt to justify his collaboration with the Nazis by invoking the 
Hobbesian standard that it was “obedience for protection.”246  
McCormick concludes his study of Schmitt by arguing that Schmitt’s Weimar 
writings were an indication of how supportive he was of an authoritarian state. By 
looking at Schmitt’s Weimar and post-Weimar writing, McCormick argues that Schmitt’s 
concept of politics never changed; he reaffirmed his belief in an authoritarian state. For 
McCormick, there is a need to look toward Jürgen Habermas for an alternative model of a 
rational society, beyond Schmitt’s power politics. According to McCormick:  
One of the tasks of critical and political theory today, one that would escape the drawbacks of 
Weberian social science, as well as the dangers exhibited by the work of its most radical 
discontented practitioners, especially Schmitt, should be an attempt to understand the relationships 
among transformation, the academic debates and the cultural stands, as well as the persistence of 
the oppositions, the antinomies, the dualisms, explicated earlier within them.247  
 
McCormick believes there is a need to embrace a diversifying culture, to understand and 
develop as a unified culture among other nations, and to not adhere to the fascist mind of 
Schmitt. McCormick as well as Schwab are both examples of those who were initially 
critical of Schmitt when he arrived in modern American political theory. Schwab’s 
interpretation of Schmitt as an advocate of National Socialism and McCormick’s 
argument that Schmitt’s thought was always a part of National Socialism demonstrate 
why some on the political Left thought Schmitt’s concept of politics was dangerous. 
Along with McCormick and Schwab, there were other Leftist scholars interested in 
defaming Schmitt’s work because of his collaboration with the National Socialist Party.   
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Published in 1998, Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism248 
included twelve essays on Schmitt written by different scholars. Edited by David 
Dyzenhaus, a Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, Law as Politics offers 
different perspectives on Schmitt’s political and legal work. This volume provides us 
with a good opportunity to recognize why particular scholars defend the work of Schmitt, 
while others denounce it. Although all of the essays reveal interesting aspects of Schmitt, 
only some of these interpretations will be addressed here. 
John McCormick’s essay in this volume, “The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl 
Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers,” is critical of Schmitt. McCormick 
specifically looks at Schmitt’s line from Political Theology: “Sovereign is he who 
decides the exception,” to show how this line signifies the overall trajectory of Schmitt’s 
Weimar work.249 Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is based on a false notion of 
parliamentary democracy, according to McCormick, because parliamentary democracy is 
not meant to be closed off from the public or to thwart the political populace; instead, 
parliamentary democracy ensures that the public is not self-destructive. Moreover, 
Schmitt based his critique of liberalism on eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberals, 
according to McCormick, who were naïve to constitutional emergency powers.250  
To conclude his essay, McCormick explains why Schmitt’s The Dictatorship is 
misread as a book of arguments. Schmitt wrote The Dictatorship to explain the value of 
exceptional situations that call for a sovereign dictator. He explains this through different 
histories. The transition from The Dictatorship to Political Theology, McCormick argues, 
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is that it presents Schmitt’s change from conservatism to fascism. McCormick, however, 
does argue that we should not conflate Schmitt’s concept of popular sovereignty with 
emergency powers, for it shows the difference between a commissarial and sovereign 
leader in an emergency situation.251 
Law as Politics offers certain scholars’ interpretations of Schmitt’s critique of 
liberalism. In “Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy,”252 the Belgian 
political theorist, Chantal Mouffe scrutinizes Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy.253 
Mouffe is concerned with the boundaries of citizenship and the nature of liberal 
democratic consensus. Specifically, Mouffe argues that Schmitt’s belief that democracy 
and liberalism contradict offers some insight into the boundaries of modern citizenship. 
Mouffe discusses Schmitt’s notion of “homogeneity” and how it relates to the democratic 
conception of equality, especially as a substantive equality, rather than an abstract 
conception. Schmitt rejects the notion that the equality of citizens can serve as the 
foundation of a state, because it does not establish criteria for political institutions. 
Mouffe states: “He [Schmitt] claims that liberalism negates democracy and democracy 
negates liberalism and that parliamentary democracy, since it consists in the articulation 
between democracy and liberalism, is therefore a nonviable regime.”254 Ultimately, 
Mouffe believes that Schmitt’s critique of liberalism offers insight into why liberal 
universalism cannot exist.  
At the conclusion of Mouffe’s essay, she explains that Schmitt’s rejection of 
pluralism is a warning that should be heeded. Mouffe believes that Schmitt’s critique of 
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liberalism challenges the failure of commonality that exists within pluralism. According 
to Mouffe: “Once we have recognized that the unity of the people is the result of a 
political construction, we need to explore all the logical possibilities that a political 
articulation entails.”255 Unlike Schwab and McCormick, Mouffe has a desire to apply 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism to overcome the weaknesses in liberalism that many 
liberals fail to recognize.  
   In 1999, William Scheuerman, a critic of Schmitt, published Carl Schmitt: The 
End of Law.256 Scheuerman describes the trajectory of Schmitt’s American reception 
during the 1990s among different scholars, and illustrates the reasons why certain 
political theorists, or political philosophers criticized Schmitt. Scheuerman argues that 
Schmitt’s actions exposed his nature as a political theorist. Specifically, Scheuerman 
points to Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis. Before Scheuerman arrives at this point 
in part one of his book, “The Jurisprudence of Lawlessness,”257 he describes Schmitt’s 
interpretation of law and parliamentarism. He explains that Schmitt’s pre-Weimar writing 
was applied in modern critical theory – referring broadly to other leftists interpretation of 
Schmitt – when there should have been some concern about how Schmitt’s writing 
indicated his support for an authoritarian state. Schmitt was critical of a legal or 
administrative decision, because he supported an authoritarian state that was unregulated 
by legal and political constraints. An authoritarian state “celebrates” the willfulness of 
legal experience, whereas, according to Scheuerman, a liberal democratic state is 
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committed to the rule of law, aware of the harsh realities of legal indeterminacy.258 
Ultimately, Scheuerman argues that there are harsh implications in supporting the 
willfulness of law that can be learned by knowing the example of Carl Schmitt.259  
Scheuerman also discusses Schmitt’s critique of parliamentarism and liberal 
constitutionalism. He argues that Schmitt’s critique of legal indeterminacy is part of his 
critique of parliamentarism. The failure in Schmitt’s critique of parliamentarism, 
according to Scheuerman, is that it is anachronistic. Schmitt bases his critique of 
parliamentarism on a nineteenth-century parliamentary system. For Scheuerman, 
parliament represents open discussion, not one-sided representative democracy, as 
Schmitt claims. Scheuerman also argues that Constitutional Theory, which was published 
in 1928, shows Schmitt as an antipode to liberal constitutionalism.260 Scheuerman 
believes that Schmitt was critical of liberal constitutionalism because Schmitt was critical 
of the arbitrary divisons among parliamentary and judicial action. According to Schmitt, 
normativism existed as part of liberal constitutionalism and a parliamentary system. 
Scheuerman argues, overall, that Schmitt’s writing has no value in regards to liberal 
indeterminacy, liberal constitutionalism, or parliamentarism.  
Scheuerman also argues that Schmitt’s theory of the state made him vulnerable to 
the National Socialist Party.261 Scheuerman discusses how Schmitt overcame legal 
indeterminacy through the National Socialist Party: 
As we have seen, for Schmitt the central problem of modern legal theory is the enigma of legal 
indeterminacy, according to which legal norms inevitably fail to provide mean guidance to legal 
decision makers. Schmitt sides with the Nazis because he sees them as offering a real chance for 
developing a novel legal order able to ‘solve’ the dilemma of legal indeterminacy.262 
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Scheuerman believes that Schmitt’s concern with legal indeterminacy explains why 
Schmitt supported a total state, and why he eventually joined the National Socialist Party. 
It ultimately shows why Schmitt’s contribution to the debate on legal indeterminacy 
provides important lessons for contemporary legal theory.263 Schmitt believed that legal 
determinacy was based on racial homogeneity, liberating state officials, in order to 
salvage legal determinacy. Yet, according to Scheuerman, it resulted in Nazi terror.  
Part two of Scheuerman’s work on Schmitt, “Schmitt in America,” is about 
Schmitt’s relationship to the Austrian economists and political scientists, Joseph 
Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, and Hans Morgenthau. Since Morgenthau’s relationship to 
Schmitt was already discussed in chapter one, it is only relevant to assess Schmitt’s 
relationship to Hayek and Schumpeter. In this final section of Scheuerman’s study, he 
attempts to demonstrate how Schmitt’s post-Nazi writings were appropriated by Hayek 
and Schumpeter, to convey a warning about how Schmitt’s intellectual thought is present 
in post-war American political theory.  
Scheuerman presents the similarities between Schmitt and Schumpeter in regards 
to democratic elitism. Based on this concept, Schmitt and Schumpeter discussed some 
notion of an authoritarian state, which would influence American legal theory. Both men 
were concerned with formulating a critical response to Max Weber’s theory of modern 
Western rationalism. Their responses, as Scheuerman notes, were very similar in that 
they believed that parliamentarism must be supplanted – rather than what Weber 
believed, which was supplementing parliamentarism with mass-based plebiscitarianism. 
It should be noted that Schumpeter and Schmitt were similar, but not identical, in their 
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concept of an authoritarian state. Moreover, Scheuerman addresses Schmitt’s and 
Schumpeter’s opposition to Weber when he states: “Both Schmitt and Schumpeter make 
it clear that not only the possession of charismatic capacities make effective leadership 
possible (for Schmitt, in the state; for Schumpeter, within the factory), but also such skills 
are possessed by only a tiny minority of human beings.”264 Scheuerman believes that 
Schumpeter argued something similar to Schmitt: that politics is ruled by elites. For this 
reason, Scheuerman argues that Schumpeter was not very far from Schmitt’s 
authoritarian approach. Regardless, Scheuerman argues that Schumpeter’s “democratic 
elitism” was a reformulated understanding of totalitarianism, which was more palatable 
to an American audience,265 and which did eventually influence American political 
theorists.  
Beyond Schmitt’s influence on democratic theory, Scheuerman argues that 
Schmitt also had a profound impact on the Austrian émigré economist, Friedrich Hayek. 
In Scheuerman’s final chapter on Schmitt, he explores Schmitt’s influence on 
contemporary free-market conservatism. Attempting to elucidate the relationship between 
Hayek and Schmitt, he shows how authoritarianism and capitalism have coexisted. While 
Schmitt was critical of the welfare state, and favored instead an authoritarian state, Hayek 
was hesitant to accept this alternative. Scheuerman explains, however, that Hayek 
perceived the welfare state as revolutionary threat, and thus was willing to find any 
means to combat this threat.  
 Scheuerman’s study represents another critique of Schmitt and the theorists he 
influenced. It provides additional insight into how certain scholars perceived Schmitt’s 
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theoretical concepts at the end of the 1990s. Scheuerman chooses to address Schmitt’s 
involvement with the Nazis to devalue his work, and to show how irrelevant and 
dangerous Schmitt is to contemporary political theory. It is also important to note that the 
scholarly work on Schmitt during the 1990s was mostly concerned with his involvement 
with the National Socialist Party. The writing on Schmitt already presented in this chapter 
has shown the different arguments about why Schmitt is perceived as a threat in 
contemporary political theory, considering the danger of his political work and what 
certain scholars believe it led to. The final two works on Schmitt that are presented in this 
chapter, however, argue something different than these previous scholars. 
 
Representations of Left-Schmittians 
 This section of the chapter also draws from those who argue against Schmitt’s 
work but from a perspective beyond his involvement with the National Socialist Party. In 
The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, 266 Gopal Balakrishnan, Professor of 
European Intellectual History at the University of California, Santa Cruz, shows how 
critical he is of Schmitt, but for different reasons beyond Schmitt’s involvement with the 
Nazis. Balakrishnan also finds Schmitt relevant for certain reasons. Understanding the 
broader context of Balakrishnan’s work on Schmitt will provide us with a clearer picture 
of why Schmitt has been discussed in recent American political thought. 
 To understand Balakrishnan’s argument, only specific sections of his study will 
be presented here. This process will help to draw out what Balakrishnan argues about 
Schmitt. He explains in his introduction that the purpose of his study is to use Schmitt’s 
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political thought to understand contemporary political liberalism. Particularly, he is 
concerned with Schmitt’s work from 1919 to 1950.267 Balakrishnan studies Schmitt for 
the purpose of exploring both the danger and the relevance of Schmitt’s thought, through 
a systematic and comprehensive study.268               
Balakrishnan’s study of Schmitt is in many ways an intellectual biography, with 
the exception that it does not discuss every part of Schmitt’s life and focuses more on his 
political work. First, by addressing Schmitt’s work in the 1920s – such as The 
Dictatorship (1921); The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Political Theology 
(1922), The Concept of the Political (1926) – Balakrishnan shows how Schmitt 
developed his theoretical critique of liberalism. In the early 1920s, Schmitt wrote The 
Dictatorship, explaining the value of a dictatorship that is sovereign in contrast to one 
that is commissarial. Balakrishnan explains that Schmitt grappled with the idea of a 
counter-revolutionary dictatorship as well as a very different idea that was based on how 
the Catholic Church could stabilize the postwar situation. He also grappled with the idea 
of integration of the masses into a homogeneous’ national democracy.269  
When Political Theology was published in 1922, Schmitt believed that 
Catholicism could be the mediator between political nations, according to Balakrishnan. 
He also argues that Catholicism played a major role in the early part of Schmitt’s thought 
and led him to rationalize a sovereign dictatorship that could protect a nation from other 
nations and unite a state under one ruler. Balakrishnan also argues that Schmitt’s critique 
of parliamentarism, which was published in the form of an essay a few years after 
Political Theology, showed his theoretical affinities to Donoso Cortés, Charles Maurras, 
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and Benito Mussolini.270 Schmitt defended a strong concept of sovereignty, according to 
Balakrishnan, because he opposed the neutrality of legal positivism.   
Balakrishnan argues that when Schmitt became part of the Nazi regime, it was 
because he was left with no alternative. Furthermore, Balakrishnan believes that, 
although Schmitt was critical of political liberalism, the neutrality of legal positivism, and 
parliamentary democracy, he was not a fascist thinker. According to Balakrishnan:  
Unable to see the Nazis as a force of renewal, he was also unwilling to support efforts to stabilize 
the Republic, as this would have put him on the other – the ‘left’ – side of the political fence. 
Failing, perhaps, to sense the necessity of making a decision here, he put his trust in ineffectual 
conspiracies.271  
 
Balakrishnan does not condemn Schmitt for the role he played with the Nazis. Although 
Balakrishnan does not support the work of Schmitt entirely, he does not concentrate on 
Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis, but rather points to more important parts of 
Schmitt’s work in legal and political theory.  
Balakrishnan, however, does not overlook Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis. 
He explains that Schmitt was initially enthusiastic to be part of the National Socialist 
Party. Schmitt changed his belief, however, when he thought the will of the people 
represented the will of the state. When the National Socialist Party came to power, 
Schmitt favored a sovereign leader. After he was forced to resign from his position in the 
National Socialist Party, Schmitt returned to a more sharpened understanding of his 
political theory. Balakrishnan notes the subtle difference in Schmitt’s work when he 
states: “While in earlier works references to the mysteries of evil were an undercurrent, 
an interplay of tone and allusion, they now began to press closer to the surface, 
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periodically erupting, as he sought to form a more vivid picture of the enemy.”272 This 
enemy would be in the form of a myth, something that Schmitt derived from Hobbes. 
Balakrishnan argues that Schmitt wrote about the Leviathan myth because after 
understanding the power of the National Socialist Party, it became clearer that control 
over the people of the state could be established through the fear of a mythic creature.  
In Balakrishnan’s conclusion, he explains what he believes will be the future 
reception of Schmitt. Part of the relevance of Schmitt, according to Balakrishnan, is his 
insight into international relations, especially how it relates to world domination. 
Balakrishnan believes that the rising power of the U.S poses a universal threat, 
particularly how it related to the invasion in Iraq, which makes Schmitt especially 
relevant to modern legal and political theory. Ultimately Balakrishnan argues that 
Schmitt’s critique of universalism is critical to understanding the threat of U.S hegemony, 
as it continues to develop into the post-modern age. However, similar to the previous 
authors, Balakrishnan believes that Schmitt is also dangerous because he advocates war, 
and because of his concepts of friend and enemy, a sovereign dictator, and the state of 
emergency.  
Chantel Mouffe’s 1997 essay, “Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal 
Democracy,”273 describes Schmitt’s work on liberalism as a contribution to 
understanding the tension that exists between democracy and liberalism. Mouffe argues 
that Schmitt’s belief in the homogeneity of the people in representing a democracy is 
something that modern liberalism seems to escape. Schmitt did not believe in liberal 
individuality, but in the unity of the people to elect a sovereign ruler that decides in an 
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emergency situation. The unity of the people is part of what defines democracy, apart 
from liberalism. According to Mouffe, “Schmitt makes an important point when he 
stresses that the democratic concept of equality is a political one which therefore entails 
the possibility of a distinction.”274 As another advocate of Schmitt, Mouffe is different 
from Balakrishnan in recognizing how Schmitt is valuable because of how he separates 
the homogeneity of the people as a true representation of democracy from liberal 
individualism. Furthermore, Mouffe argues that political states are defined by political 
entities that are represented by different citizens. She argues that Schmitt’s belief in the 
homogeneity of a state, separate from other entities, is a lesson that liberals need to 
adhere to because of their firm belief in globalization. Globalization mistakenly 
prioritizes economics over politics, according to Mouffe.275  
In recognizing Schmitt’s work on the homogeneity of the state, she is critical of 
political liberalism. She praises Schmitt’s work on defining democracy as the will of the 
people, not as an enclosed political party that is representative of the people. Mouffe 
makes this clearer when she states, “Liberal democratic politics consists in fact in the 
constant process of negotiation and renegotiation – through different hegemonic 
articulation – of this constitutive paradox.”276 Mouffe argues that there is a need to take 
seriously Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy and to accept Schmitt’s insight into 
inclusion/exclusion – the distinction of the power of the people as opposed to the power 
of representatives. Mouffe believes that Schmitt addresses weaknesses in a liberal 
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democracy, and that he can help us find the solution to the paradox of liberal democracy 
and the problems of globalization.277    
Princeton Political Theorist, Jan-Werner Müller’s insightful work, A Dangerous 
Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought,278 is concerned with Schmitt’s work 
after World War II and with Schmitt’s European reception, specifically politically and 
culturally.279 It reveals how Schmitt’s political thought has spread from his homeland of 
Germany, to other parts of the country, and why there are followers of Schmitt globally.   
Müller believes that there is a need to reverse the perception of Schmitt. The main 
purpose of Müller’s study is not to delve into what Schmitt thought, but rather to examine 
the idiosyncrasies of his career. Specifically, Müller intends to show which countries 
have been attracted to Schmitt’s political thought after 1945, in order to show the danger 
of his ideas. According to Müller: “…he [Schmitt] employed what has been a kind of 
philosophical ‘double talk,’ shifting the meaning of concepts central to his theory and 
scattering allusions and false leads throughout his work.”280 Müller argues that regardless 
of how confusing his writing is, there is a certain attraction to what Schmitt wrote. One of 
the primary reasons for this attraction, according to Müller, is that Schmitt’s writing, and 
specifically his political work, is aesthetic. Schmitt’s aesthetic writing held purpose, and 
therefore was not accidental.281 Müller believes that Schmitt embodies a mindset of 
“philosophical or anthropological conservatism.”282 Müller explains this concept by 
stating: “It is a mindset that seeks to cut through the web of liberal procedures and 
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indirect action which mediate every political claim and to end the endless liberal 
postponements of final decisions in favor of what is both the ultimate and the 
immediate.”283 This statement captures Müller’s explanation of what he sees as the 
essence of Schmitt’s thought, which is different from traditional conservatism because it 
is predisposed towards direct action and decisionism.284 Schmitt believes that there is a 
political morality beyond humanitarian and economic causes. It is important to 
understand what Müller argues about Schmitt, especially regarding political liberalism 
and universalism, because he provides a different perspective on how Schmitt has been 
interpreted.  
The first section of Müller’s work on Schmitt is on his career during the 1920s 
and early 1930s. In the second section he explains Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and 
modern universalism in his post-World War II writing. Müller explains how Schmitt’s 
vision of global order developed in the 1940s. Müller argues that Schmitt’s vision of 
global world order was often inaccurate. Schmitt desired a return to an old liberal order in 
Europe, without the interference of U.S power. That is why Schmitt devoted written work 
on spatial order and land appropriation, to protect European nation-states. 
 Müller also writes about how Schmitt’s concept of globalization has been 
appropriated in Europe and the U.S. Most importantly, for our purposes here, Müller 
discusses Schmitt’s Anglo-American reception and how it has affected American 
political theory. Müller discusses the modern global humanitarian movement that has 
brought violence. According to Müller: “…it was in fact the global multiculturalist 
management of ‘unity in difference’ and the formation of a rationalist consensus around 
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humanitarian principles itself that produced apparently irrational and contingent 
outbreaks of cruelty and violence.”285 Müller believes that the Left displaced politics into 
ethics and economics. Globalization was a false form of universalism.286 It was a form of 
imperialism that spread American liberalism according to Müller. Developing a critique 
of this imperialism is where the political Left found value in Schmitt, who believed that 
the U.S was becoming an imperial power, already after World War I. Liberal 
universalism in particular, argues Müller, advocated for new wars, in which interventions 
would become a matter of policing. Schmitt argued against this universalism because it 
did not recognize legitimate enemies. Liberal universalism was a humanitarian movement 
that deceptively promoted war.   
As liberal universalism spread globally, Müller argues that Schmitt was becoming 
more relevant among the political Left. He states, “Schmitt’s apocalyptic vision that 
almost anything was preferable to liberalism had apparently invaded the Marxist 
imagination – and often made it into a form of messianism.”287 Müller argues that the 
developing tension in international conflicts allowed Schmitt to surface among the Left 
and the Right because of his work on spatial order. Specifically, during the 1990s, Müller 
explains that the U.S experienced the resurgence of populism. Müller also notes that 
liberalism remained the dominant ideology in the U.S. during the 1990s, allowing 
Schmitt to make his way into American political theory, with scholars divided on whether 
Schmitt was a danger or an insightful diagnostician.288 
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 Müller criticizes liberal universalism as a humanitarian façade, which in reality, 
spreads violence to different nations. Schmitt criticized liberal universalism because it 
ignored the political intensity between nation-states, a sovereign leader, and the unity of 
the people. Müller states: “Schmitt’s ultimate challenge to philosophical liberals will 
perhaps be this: can a ‘post-heroic’ age create new, supranational identities without 
enmity or even some form of homogeneity?”289 Müller argues that liberal universalism is 
an attempt to establish universal homogeneity, as one global-nation. The problem with 
this, according to Müller, is that the failure of globalization through humanitarian military 
intervention will always be vulnerable to Schmitt’s critique of universalism. Müller 
ultimately argues that liberalism must accept political difference rather than forcing 
liberalism in other countries. When the task of liberalism is to share existence with other 
countries, it must recognize the struggle with the enemy.290    
  Although Müller is critical of Schmitt, he understands why Schmitt is seen as 
insightful. Many of the scholars that have been discussed in this chapter chose to attack 
Schmitt’s involvement with the National Socialist Party. Yet, to understand why Schmitt 
has been so influential in political theory, one must not attack his character, but assess the 
relevance of his political work in relation to modern political theory. Müller’s study of 
Schmitt is the most useful in understanding why Schmitt’s critique of globalization 
continues to appear among the political Left. When liberal universalism triumphed in the 
latter part of the twentieth century, it was often through humanitarian military 
interventions. It created violence. Those critical of liberal universalism found Schmitt 
useful because he understood that enmity exists between nation-states, and universalism 
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could never be achieved. Müller ultimately argues that to understand Schmitt’s global 
reception, there is a need to look at the development of liberal universalism. He shows 
why Schmitt’s presence was needed in modern political theory.  
 
Conclusion 
Through the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first century, political theorists found 
Carl Schmitt’s work intriguing. Our examination here of his influence on Morgenthau 
and Strauss, the Leftist journal,Telos, and other contemporary Leftist theorists, addresses 
how Schmitt was perceived in the U.S. Despite all the criticism of Schmitt’s involvement 
with the Nazis, his work continues to resurface among the political Left – mainly in the 
form of a debate about how valuable his critiques of universalism and liberalism are to 
the Left. With Morgenthau and Strauss, we have seen Schmitt’s early influence and how 
his ideas crossed the Atlantic. With Telos, Schmitt’s work was a reoccurring theme. He 
represented a way to reconstruct the Left after the perceived decline of Marxism during 
the 1980s. Among the other contemporary Leftist that have written about Schmitt, some 
are critical of his involvement with the Nazis, while others believe that he provided a way 
to overcome idealistic liberalism and universalism, and brought clarity to understanding 
political enmity.   
Schmitt’s reception ultimately demonstrates how important he continues to be in 
political theory. His ideas are still prevalent among some on the Left, who are more 
accepting of a different approach – one that entails an open mind toward global order, 
toward rethinking populism and political sovereignty. Furthermore, even those critical of 
Schmitt – Balakrishnan, McCormick, and others – have only enhanced his image in 
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contemporary political theory. His reception in Telos only demonstrated how desperate 
some on the Left were to reorient themselves after the fall of Soviet Communism. To 
them, Schmitt seemed to provide a way to think beyond traditional Leftist thought. In a 
1987 essay in Telos, Piccone and Ulmen defended Schmitt for his ability to critique 
liberalism and universalism: “ Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is not accompanied by an 
illiberal answer but leaves open the question of an alternative.”291 Schmitt’s presence 
among the Left, particularly in Telos, represented a viable solution to a weakened Left. 
While some are critical of Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis, it is only a way for 
them to summarily dismiss his work. Müller’s work on Schmitt is so valuable because it 
recognizes Schmitt’s critique of liberal universalism as a practical alternative to Leftist 
idealism.  
Schmitt’s American reception on the Left represents how valuable his work has 
become. There is a need, however, to not misinterpret Schmitt’s value. There is a need to 
understand Schmitt’s value. His presence in Telos was a way to rethink Western 
Marxism, specifically its critique of liberal universalism. It also led Piccone and others 
involved with Telos to rethink populism and the violence of universalism. For Piccone, 
populism was an alternative to political representation, away from political parties as well 
as a distant ruler. It represented state homogeneity instead of violent universalism.  For 
those on the political Left that have come to accept Schmitt’s work, it is a realization that 
political enmity exists. Schmitt’s political work may not be the best solution to 
strengthening the Left, but it is a closer step to acknowledging the violent political 
realities that exist in the modern world.      
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